

Nietzsche and Rand:

A Comparison of Positions on 124 Issues

Stephen R.C. Hicks, Philosophy, Rockford University

Updated June 2020

Summary

124 issues tabulated below with quotations and sources.

Agreements between Nietzsche and Rand:	21
Disagreements:	95
Semi-agree/ disagree:	8

Of the agreements:

Negative agreements:	9
Positive agreements:	12

Bibliography

Nietzsche's works cited	Rand's works cited
A <i>The Antichrist</i> [1888]	AF <i>The Art of Fiction</i> (2000)
BGE <i>Beyond Good & Evil</i> [1886]	AF <i>The Art of Nonfiction</i> (2001)
BT <i>The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music</i> [1872]	ARL <i>The Ayn Rand Letter</i> (1971-1976)
CW <i>The Case of Wagner</i> [1888]	AS <i>Atlas Shrugged</i> (1957)
D <i>Daybreak</i> [1881]	CUI <i>Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal</i> (1966)
EH <i>Ecce Homo</i> [written 1888]	F <i>The Fountainhead</i> (1943)
GM <i>Genealogy of Morals</i> [1887]	FNI <i>For the New Intellectual</i> (1961)
JS <i>The Joyous Science</i> [1882]	IOE <i>Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology</i> (1979)
HA <i>Human, All-Too-Human</i> [1878]	JAR <i>Journals of Ayn Rand</i> (1997)
SE <i>Schopenhauer as Educator</i> [1874]	NL <i>The New Left: The Anti-Industrial Revolution</i> (1971)
SSW <i>The Struggle Between Science and Wisdom</i>	PWNI <i>Philosophy: Who Needs It</i> (1982)
TFEMS <i>Truth and Falsehood in an Extra-moral Sense</i>	RM <i>The Romantic Manifesto</i> (1969)

TGS <i>The Greek State</i> [1871]	TO <i>The Objectivist</i> (1966-1971)
TI <i>Twilight of the Idols</i> [1888]	TON <i>The Objectivist Newsletter</i> (1962-1965)
WP <i>The Will to Power</i> [1889; unpublished in Nietzsche's lifetime]	VOS <i>The Virtue of Selfishness</i> (1964)
WS <i>The Wanderer and His Shadow</i> [1880]	WTL <i>We the Living</i> (1936/1959)
Z <i>Thus Spake Zarathustra</i> [1883-85]	

Issue	Nietzsche's position	Rand's position
Metaphysics		
1. Fundamental stuff of the universe	<p>"the innermost essence of being is will to power" (<i>WP</i> 693).</p> <p>Materialism. "The most important philosophical work, which has appeared in the last ten years doubtless is Lange's <i>History of Materialism</i>. Kant, Schopenhauer, and this book of Lange's—I need no more." (Letter of November 1866 to Hermann Mushacke)</p>	<p>No armchair physics. "<i>'Cosmology' has to be thrown out of philosophy.</i>" (Note from June 1958, <i>JAR</i> 698, emphasis in original)</p> <p>"Actually, do you know what we can ascribe to the universe as such, apart from scientific discovery? Only those fundamentals that we can grasp about existence. Not in the sense of switching contexts and ascribing particular characteristics to the universe, but we can say: since everything possesses identity, the universe possesses identity. Since everything is finite, the universe is finite. But we can't ascribe space or time or a lot of other things to the universe as a whole. (<i>ITOE</i>, 273)</p> <p>"Nature, i.e., the universe as a whole, cannot be created or annihilated ... it cannot come into or go out of existence. Whether its basic constituent elements are atoms, or subatomic particles, or some yet undiscovered forms of energy, it is not ruled by a consciousness or by will or by chance, but by the law of identity. All the countless forms, motions, combinations and dissolutions of elements within the universe—from a floating speck of dust to the formation of a galaxy to the emergence of life—are caused and determined by the identities of the elements involved. Nature is the metaphysically given—i.e., the nature of nature is outside the power of any volition." (<i>PWNI</i>, "The Metaphysical Versus the Man-Made," 25)</p>
2. Entity or process	Process (<i>WP</i> 552, 1067; <i>BGE</i> 54); "the lie of unity, the lie of thinghood, of	Entities as objective; no armchair physics (<i>GS</i> , <i>FNI</i> , pb 125; <i>IOE</i> , 18; <i>JAR</i> 698)

	<p>substance, of permanence.”(TI “Reason” in Philosophy 2)</p> <p>“there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything.” This substance/action ontology leads people to maintain the belief that “<i>the strong man is free</i> to be weak and the bird of prey to be a lamb—for thus they gain the right to make the bird of prey <i>accountable</i> for being a bird of prey.” (GM 1:13)</p>	
3. Monism, dualism, or pluralism	<p>Monism (WP 1067).</p> <p>“Descartes was the first to have dared, with admirable boldness, to understand the animal as <i>machine</i>; the whole of our physiology endeavors to prove this claim. And we are consistent enough not to except man, as Descartes still did” (A14).</p>	Naturalism: no armchair physics (JAR 698)
4. Identity	<p>No: “Logic is subject to the following condition: <i>suppose that there are identical cases</i>. In fact, for there to be logical thought and inference, the fulfilment of this condition must be invented first. That is, the demand for <i>logical truth</i> can only take place after a fundamental <i>falsification</i> of all events has been effected. From which it follows that an instinct prevails here which is capable of employing two means: first, falsification, and second, the implementation of a point of view. In short, logic does not spring from a demand for truth.” (WP 512)</p> <p>Also WP 507-517)</p>	Yes (GS, FNI, 152, pb 125; 186, pb 150; 188; pb 152; 192, pb 154; IOE, 78, 6)
5. Identity and change compatible	No (WP 520)	Yes (GS, FNI, 192, pb 154)
6. Causality	<p>No (WP 497, 545-552). JS 112</p> <p>Yet regular reductionist causal explanations.</p> <p>Not “mechanistic”: “Let us even beware of believing the universe is a machine: it is certainly not constructed for one purpose, and calling it a</p>	Yes (GS, FNI, 188, pb 151; “The Metaphysical vs. the Man-Made,” PWNI, 30; pb 25)

	'machine' does it far too much honor." (<i>JS</i> 109)	
7. Teleology	No: "Let us even beware of believing the universe is a machine: it is certainly not constructed for one purpose, and calling it a 'machine' does it far too much honor." (<i>JS</i> 109) Also: <i>WP</i> 552, 1067, Postcard to Overbeck.	Yes for organisms (<i>VoS</i> , 6, pb 16; <i>IOE</i> , 42)
8. Direction to evolution	Yes (<i>GM</i> II:24)	No armchair physics <i>or</i> biology
9. Existence of God	No (<i>JS</i> 108; 125)	No (<i>GS</i> , <i>FNI</i> , 184; pb 148)
10. Consciousness as functional/useful	Yes (<i>WP</i> 505)	Yes (<i>VoS</i> , 9, pb 18; <i>IOE</i> , 38)
11. Consciousness as causal	No (<i>WP</i> 477-478, 524); not an independent agent controlling itself, the body but a passive reflector and "nothing but a <i>certain behaviour of the instincts toward one another</i> " (<i>JS</i> 333) ; as merely a felt effect of struggle among instincts for supremacy (<i>WP</i> 677) "The 'inner world' is full of phantoms and will-o'-the-wisps: the will is one of them. The will no longer moves anything, hence does not explain anything either—it merely accompanies events; it can also be absent. The so-called <i>motive</i> : another error. Merely a surface phenomenon of consciousness, something alongside the deed that is more likely to cover up the antecedents of the deeds than to represent them. And as for the <i>ego</i> ! That has become a fable, a fiction, a play on words: it has altogether ceased to think, feel, or will. "What follows from this? There are no mental causes at all." (<i>TI</i> "The Four Great Errors" 3)	Yes ("The Metaphysical vs. the Man-Made," <i>PWNI</i> , 30, pb 25)
12. Psychology reduced to biology	Yes: <i>JS</i> 134 and 145 on diet, drink, and air quality, as explaining the spread of pessimistic, nihilist philosophies. "Europe would never have become Christian in the first place if the culture of the ancient world in the south had not gradually been barbarized through	No

	an excessive admixture of Teutonic barbarian blood, thus losing its cultural superiority.” (JS 149)	
<i>Epistemology</i>		
13. Consciousness as identification	<p>No (BGE 211; WP 473, 479, 481, 507, 511, 513, 516, 521); the “ridiculous overestimation and misunderstanding of consciousness” (JS 11); GM II:16</p> <p>Consciousness as a <i>defense</i> mechanism against reality, not a <i>cognitive</i> mechanism. Language and art as shields, as comforting illusions.</p> <p>“We do not even have any organ at all for <i>knowing</i>, for ‘truth’; we ‘know’ ... just as much as may be <i>useful</i> in the interest of the human herd.” (JS 354)</p>	Yes (GS, FNI, 152; pb 124; IOE, 37, 73, 106)
14. Sensations as awareness of reality	<p>No (WP 479)</p> <p><i>Daybreak</i> 117: “<i>In prison.</i>” “The habits of our senses have woven us into lies and deception of sensation: these again are the basis of all our judgments and ‘knowledge’—there is absolutely no escape, no backway or bypath in the the <i>real world!</i>”</p> <p>Yes: “they [the senses] do not lie at all. What we make of their testimony, that alone introduces lies; for example the lie of unity, the lie of thinghood, of substance, of permanence. ‘Reason’ is the cause of our falsification of the testimony of the senses. Insofar as the senses show becoming, passing away, and change, they do not lie. ... The ‘apparent’ world is the only one: the ‘true’ world is merely added by a lie.” (TI “Reason” in Philosophy 2)</p>	Yes (IOE, 5; “Kant Versus Sullivan,” PWNI, 108, pb 90)
15. Sensations as value laden	Yes (WP 505)	No (GS, FNI, 194, pb 156)
16. Concepts as awareness of reality	No (WP 507, 513). Language as inadequate to reality (TI “Skirmishes” 26)	Yes (IOE, 71)
17. Logic as reality-based	No: “Our subjective compulsion to believe in logic indicates merely that long before we became conscious of logic itself, we did nothing but <i>introduce</i>	Yes: “Logic is the art of non-contradictory identification. A contradiction cannot exist. An atom is itself, and so is the universe; neither can contradict its own identity; nor can a part

	<p><i>its postulates into events</i>: now we find them in events — we can no longer help it — and now we would like to believe that this compulsion is a guarantee of ‘truth’. It was we who created ‘the thing’ the ‘self-same thing’, the subject, the predicate, the action, the object, the substance and the form, after we had carried the process of <i>assimilating, approximating</i> and <i>simplifying</i> as far as possible.</p> <p>“The world seems logical to us, because we have already made it logical.” (<i>WP</i> 521)</p> <p>Also: <i>WP</i> 477, 512; <i>JS</i> 111.</p>	<p>contradict the whole. No concept man forms is valid unless he integrates it without contradiction into the total sum of his knowledge. To arrive at a contradiction is to confess an error in one’s thinking; to maintain a contradiction is to abdicate one’s mind and to evict oneself from the realm of reality.” (<i>AS</i>, “Galt’s Speech”)</p> <p>Also: “Philosophical Detection,” <i>PWNI</i>, 17, pb 15.</p>
18. Sensation s, concepts, and theories as impositions upon reality	Always (<i>WP</i> 515-516)	Sensations never; false conceptions only (<i>IOE</i> , 65; <i>GS</i> , <i>FNI</i> , 154, pb 126)
19. Truth	<p>As functional only (<i>WP</i> 487); as a useful error (<i>WP</i> 493).</p> <p>“These Nay-sayers and outsiders of today who are unconditional on one point—their insistence on intellectual cleanliness, these hard, severe, abstinent heroic spirits who constitute the honor of our age; all these pale atheists, anti-Christians, immoralists, nihilists, ephectics, <i>hectics</i> of the spirit ... they certainly believe they are as completely liberated from the ascetic ideal as possible, these ‘free, <i>very</i> free spirits’ ... They are far from being <i>free</i> spirits: <i>for they still have faith in the truth</i>” (<i>GM</i> III.24).</p> <p>“The demand for an <i>adequate mode of expression</i> is <i>senseless</i>: it lies in the essence of a language, as a means of expression, to express a mere relationship—the concept ‘truth’ is <i>nonsensical</i>.” (<i>WP</i> 625)</p> <p>“Thus the <i>strength</i> of knowledge does not depend on its degree of truth but on its age, on the degree to which it has been incorporated, on its character as a condition of life.” (<i>JS</i> 110)</p> <p>“The conditions of life might include error.” (<i>JS</i> 121)</p>	Both as identification and as functional (<i>IOE</i> , 63, 65; <i>GS</i> , <i>FNI</i> , 154, pb 126; “Philosophical Detection,” <i>PWNI</i> , 16, pb 14)

	<p>“What are man’s truths ultimately? Merely his irrefutable errors.” (<i>JS</i> 265)</p> <p>“Truths are illusions whose illusoriness is overlooked.” (TFEMS)</p>	
20. Self-knowledge	<p>No: “<i>The so-called ‘ego’.</i>”</p> <p>“<i>We are none of us</i> that which we appear to be in accordance with the states for which alone we have consciousness and words, and consequently praise and blame; those cruder outbursts of which alone we are aware make us <i>misunderstand</i> ourselves, we draw a conclusion on the basis of data in which the exceptions outweigh the rule, we misread ourselves in this apparently most intelligible of handwriting on the nature of our self.” (<i>D</i> 115)</p> <p>“<i>The unknown world of the ‘subject’.</i>” (<i>D</i> 116)</p> <p>“every action is unknowable” (<i>JS</i> 335)</p> <p>“However far a man may go in self-knowledge, nothing however can be more incomplete than his image of the totality of <i>drives</i> which constitute his being.” (<i>D</i> 119)</p> <p>“Our thinking is only a picture of the primal intellect, a thinking that arises from the ideas of the single will ... I believe in the incomprehensibility of the will.” (q in Hayman 136-7)</p> <p>How does the above fit with <i>BGE</i> 6 which claims deep knowledge of self based on knowledge of surface philosophy?</p>	<p>Yes: Introspective skills. “In regard to one’s own feelings, only a rigorously conscientious habit of introspection can enable one to be certain of the nature and causes of one’s emotional responses. (<i>NL</i>, “The Age of Envy”)</p> <p>Conscious and subconscious.</p> <p>Psychological role of art in cognition.</p> <p>Friendship and love: “visibility”.</p>
21. Reason as efficacious	<p>Weakly at best: “by far the greatest part of our spirit’s activity remains unconscious and unfelt” (<i>JS</i> 333; cf. <i>JS</i> 354). “Actions are never what they appear to us to be! We have expended so much labor on learning that external things are not as they appear to us to be—very well! The case is the same with the inner world! Moral actions are in reality ‘something other than that’—more we cannot say: and all actions are essentially unknown.” (<i>D</i> 116); “in this new world they no longer possessed</p>	<p>Yes: “Since reason is man’s basic means of survival, that which is proper to the life of a rational being is the good; that which negates, opposes or destroys it is the evil. Since everything man needs has to be discovered by his own mind and produced by his own effort, the two essentials of the method of survival proper to a rational being are: thinking and productive work.” (<i>VoS</i>, “The Objectivist Ethics,” 23)</p> <p>Also: “The Left: Old and New,” <i>NL</i>, 84)</p>

	<p>their former guides, their regulating, unconscious and infallible drives: they were reduced to thinking, inferring, reckoning, co-ordinating cause and effect, these unfortunate creatures; they were reduced to their 'consciousness,' their weakest and most fallible organ!" (GM II:16)</p> <p>What we make of [the senses'] testimony, that alone introduces lies; for example the lie of unity, the lie of thinghood, of substance, of permanence. 'Reason' is the cause of our falsification of the testimony of the senses. Insofar as the senses show becoming, passing away, and change, they do not lie. . . . The 'apparent' world is the only one: the 'true' world is merely added by a lie." (TI "Reason" in Philosophy 2)</p>	
22. Reason as primary cognitive tool	<p>No (JS 354; GM II:16)</p> <p>"<i>Thoughts</i>.—Thoughts are the shadows of our feelings—always darker, emptier and simpler than these." (JS 179)</p>	<p>Yes: "Reason is the faculty that identifies and integrates the material provided by man's senses." (VOS, "The Objectivist Ethics," 20)</p> <p>And: "reason is man's only means of grasping reality and of acquiring knowledge—and, therefore, the rejection of reason means that men should act regardless of and/or in contradiction to the facts of reality." (NL, "The Left: Old and New," 84)</p> <p>Also: GS, FNI, 156, pb 128; VOS, 13, pb 20.</p>
23. Instinct as cognitively efficacious	<p>Yes (GM II:16); "'instinct' is of all the kinds of intelligence that have been discovered so far—the most intelligent." (BGE 218) "Instinct is the best" and "Our deeds must happen unconsciously" (Sixth "Self-Observation" aphorism of 1868; q in Hayman 103)</p>	<p>No. "An <i>instinct</i> of self-preservation is precisely what man does not possess. An 'instinct' is an unerring and automatic form of knowledge. A desire is not an instinct. A desire to live does not give you the knowledge required for living. And even man's desire to live is not automatic ... Your fear of death is not a love for life and will not give you the knowledge needed to keep it. Man must obtain his knowledge and choose his actions by a process of thinking, which nature will not force him to perform." (AS, "Galt's Speech")</p> <p>"In that sense, man is the weakest of animals: he is born naked and unarmed, without fangs, claws, horns or 'instinctual' knowledge." (NL, "The Anti-Industrial Revolution," 136)</p>

<p>24. Philosophy reduced to psychology</p>	<p>Yes: “Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir”. “In the philosopher, conversely, there is nothing whatever that is impersonal; and above all, his morality bears decided and decisive witness to <i>who he is</i>—that is, in what order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand in relation to each other.” (<i>BGE</i> 6; also <i>BGE</i> I:3,23)</p> <p>“our moral judgments and evaluations too are only images and fantasies based on a physiological process unknown to us” (<i>D</i> 119)</p> <p>“the <i>physiological</i> phenomenon behind the moral predispositions and prejudices” (<i>D</i> 542)</p> <p>“most of the conscious thinking of a philosopher is secretly guided and forced into certain channels by his instincts.” (<i>BGE</i> 3)</p>	<p>No: “since the work of man’s mind is not automatic, his values, like all his premises, are the product either of his thinking or of his evasions: man chooses his values by a conscious process of thought—or accepts them by default, by subconscious associations, on faith, on someone’s authority, by some form of social osmosis or blind imitation. Emotions are produced by man’s premises, held consciously or subconsciously, explicitly or implicitly.” (<i>VöS</i>, “The Objectivist Ethics,” 27)</p>
<p>25. Philosophy as systematic</p>	<p>Yes: “We [philosophers] have no right to isolated acts of any kind: we may not make isolated errors or hit upon isolated truths. Rather do our ideas, our values, our yeas and nays, our ifs and buts, grow out of us with the necessity with which a tree bears fruit—related and each with an affinity to each, and evidence of one will, one health, one soil, one sun.” (<i>GM</i>, Preface: 2)</p> <p>No: “<i>Beware of systematizers!</i> —There is a play-acting of systematizers: ... they will to impersonate complete and uniformly strong natures.” (<i>D</i> 318)</p> <p>“I mistrust all systematizers and I avoid them. The will to system is a lack of integrity” (<i>TI</i> Maxims and Arrows 26)</p> <p>Issue of organic growth versus top-down intellectualized imposition?</p>	<p>Yes (“The Chicken’s Homecoming,” <i>NL</i>, 107)</p>
<p>26. Philosophy and Science relationship</p>	<p>Continuity and strong overlap of content;</p> <p>Anti-<i>a-priori</i> speculation.</p>	<p>“Science was born as a result and consequence of philosophy; it cannot survive without a philosophical (particularly epistemological) base. If philosophy perishes, science will be</p>

		<p>“Today we possess science precisely to the extent to which we have decided to <i>accept</i> the testimony of the senses—to the extent to which we sharpen them further, arm them, and have learned to think them through.” (<i>TI</i> Reason 3)</p> <p>Development: pro-science in 70s (<i>HAH</i>), then Kantian/ Schopenhaurian skepticism about the noumenal (e.g., <i>BGE</i> 21); then denies noumenal/phenomenal distinction in <i>TI</i> (“How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable”)</p> <p>“the <i>ideal</i> scholar in whom the scientific instinct, after thousands of total and semi-failures, for once blossoms and blooms to the end, is certainly one of the most precious instruments there are; but he belongs in the hand of one more powerful” (<i>BGE</i> 207; the one more powerful being a philosopher-creator)</p> <p><i>GM</i> 3: 25: “No! Don't come to me with science when I ask for the natural antagonist of the ascetic ideal ...” and: “all science ... has at present the object of dissuading man from his former respect for himself ...”</p>	<p>next to go.” (<i>FNI</i>, “For the New Intellectual,” 44)</p> <p>Continuity but sharper division of labor. E.g., on evolution.</p> <p>No-<i>a-priori</i> speculation.</p> <p>Inductive evidence’s role.</p>
27.	Intrinsicism	False (<i>GM</i> III:12; <i>BGE</i> 207)	False (<i>CUI</i> , “What is Capitalism?”, 21)
28.	Objectivism	<p>False (<i>GM</i> III:12); Objectivity versus self-identity: “The objective man is indeed a mirror: he is accustomed to submit before whatever wants to be known.” He is “only a delicate, carefully dusted, fine, mobile pot for forms that still has to wait for some content and substance in order to ‘shape’ itself accordingly—for the most part, a man without substance and content, a ‘selfless’ man.” (<i>BGE</i> 207)</p>	<p>Yes. “Objectivity begins with the realization that man (including his every attribute and faculty, including his consciousness) is an entity of a specific nature who must act accordingly; that there is no escape from the law of identity, neither in the universe with which he deals nor in the working of his own consciousness, and if he is to acquire knowledge of the first, he must discover the proper method of using the second; that there is no room for the arbitrary in any activity of man, least of all in his method of cognition—and just as he has learned to be guided by objective criteria in making his physical tools, so he must be guided by objective criteria in forming his tools of cognition: his concepts.” (“Consciousness and Identity,” <i>IOE</i>, 82)</p> <p>Also: “Introducing Objectivism,” <i>TON</i>, Aug 1962, 35.</p>

<p>29. Subjectivism</p>	<p>True: “Genuine philosophers, however, are commanders and legislators: they say, ‘thus it shall be! Their ‘knowing is creating, their creating is a legislation, their will to truth is—will to power.” (<i>BGE</i> 211). But not in the dualistic sense (<i>WP</i> 481). “One thing is needful—To ‘give style’ to one’s character—a great and rare art! In the end, when the work is finished, it becomes evident how the constraint of a single taste governed and formed everything large and small. Whether this taste was good or bad is less important than one might suppose, if only it was a single taste!” (<i>JS</i> 290)</p>	<p>False. “Objectivity is both a metaphysical and an epistemological concept. It pertains to the relationship of consciousness to existence. Metaphysically, it is the recognition of the fact that reality exists independent of any perceiver’s consciousness. Epistemologically, it is the recognition of the fact that a perceiver’s (man’s) consciousness must acquire knowledge of reality by certain means (reason) in accordance with certain rules (logic). This means that although reality is immutable and, in any given context, only one answer is true, the truth is not automatically available to a human consciousness and can be obtained only by a certain mental process which is required of every man who seeks knowledge—that there is no substitute for this process, no escape from the responsibility for it, no shortcuts, no special revelations to privileged observers—and that there can be no such thing as a final ‘authority’ in matters pertaining to human knowledge. Metaphysically, the only authority is reality; epistemologically—one’s own mind. The first is the ultimate arbiter of the second.” (“Who Is the Final Authority in Ethics?” <i>TON</i> February 1965, 7)</p> <p>Also: <i>GS</i>, <i>FNI</i>, 187, pb 150.</p>
<p>30. Perspectivalism/ Relativism</p>	<p>True (<i>GM</i> III:12; <i>WP</i> 540) ; “Egoism is the law of perspective applied to feelings: what is closest appears large and weighty, and as one moves farther away size and weight decrease.” (<i>JS</i> 162)</p>	<p>False</p>
<p>31. Faith and mysticism</p>	<p>No: “Faith is always most desired, most pressingly needed, where there is a lack of will ... that is to say, the less a person knows how to command, the more urgent his desire for that which commands, and commands sternly,—a God, prince, caste, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience.” (<i>JS</i> 347)</p> <p>“<i>Mystical explanations.</i>—Mystical explanations are considered deep. The truth is that they are not even superficial.” (<i>JS</i> 126)</p> <p>“Prayer has been invented for those people who really never have thoughts of their own and who do not know any</p>	<p>Irresponsible. “I have said that faith and force are corollaries, and that mysticism will always lead to the rule of brutality. The cause of it is contained in the very nature of mysticism.”</p> <p>And: “Mysticism is the acceptance of allegations without evidence or proof, either apart from or <i>against</i> the evidence of one’s senses and one’s reason. Mysticism is the claim to some non-sensory, non-rational, non-definable, non-identifiable means of knowledge, such as ‘instinct,’ ‘intuition,’ ‘revelation,’ or any form of ‘just knowing.’” (<i>PWNI</i>, “Faith and Force: The Destroyers of the Modern World,” 70)</p>

	elevation of the soul or at least do not notice when it occurs” (<i>JS</i> 128)	
32. Skepticism	As non-committalism: “skepticism is the most spiritual expression of a complex physiological condition that in ordinary language is called nervous exhaustion and sickness [<i>Kränklichkeit</i>]” (<i>BGE</i> 208)	<p>No. “Men have been taught either that knowledge is impossible (skepticism) or that it is available without effort (mysticism). These two positions appear to be antagonists, but are, in fact, two variants on the same theme, two sides of the same fraudulent coin: the attempt to escape the responsibility of rational cognition and the absolutism of reality—the attempt to assert the primacy of consciousness over existence.</p> <p>“Although skepticism and mysticism are ultimately interchangeable, and the dominance of one always leads to the resurgence of the other, they differ in the form of their inner contradiction—the contradiction, in both cases, between their philosophical doctrine and their psychological motivation. Philosophically, the mystic is usually an exponent of the <i>intrinsic</i> (revealed) school of epistemology; the skeptic is usually an advocate of epistemological <i>subjectivism</i>. But, psychologically, the mystic is a subjectivist who uses intrinsicism as a means to claim the primacy of <i>his</i> consciousness over that of others. The skeptic is a disillusioned intrinsicist who, having failed to find automatic supernatural guidance, seeks a substitute in the collective subjectivism of others.” (<i>ITOE</i>, “Consciousness and Identity,” 79)</p>
33. Evolutionary epistemology	“ <i>Origin of knowledge</i> .—Over immense periods of time the intellect produced nothing but errors. A few of these proved to be useful and helped to preserve the species: those who hit upon or inherited these had better luck in their struggles for themselves and their progeny. Such erroneous articles of faith ...” (<i>JS</i> 110)	Circularity problem.
34. Language	Language cannot be transparent: “for between two absolutely disparate spheres such as subject and object there can be no connections which are causal, precise or expressive, but nothing more than an <i>aesthetic</i> interaction, I mean, the transmission of hints, a stumbling translation into a wholly foreign	Cognitive and functional. “Language is a code of visual-auditory symbols that serves the psycho-epistemological function of converting concepts into the mental equivalent of concretes. Language is the exclusive domain and tool of concepts. Every word we use (with the exception of proper names) is a symbol that denotes a concept, i.e., that stands for an

	language, for which we invariably need a freely poeticizing and freely inventive intermediate faculty an intermediate area.” (TFEMS)	unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind.” (ITOE, “Concept-Formation,” 10–11)
35. Science as useful falsehoods	<p>“<i>Science furthers ability, not knowledge.</i>” (HAH 256)</p> <p>“It is precisely the best science that will best know how to keep us in this <i>simplified</i>, utterly artificial, well-invented, well-falsified world, how unwillingly willing science loves error because, being alive,—it loves life!” (BGE 24)</p>	No. “Science was born as a result and consequence of philosophy; it cannot survive without a philosophical (particularly epistemological) base. If philosophy perishes, science will be next to go.” (FNI, “For the New Intellectual,” 44)
Human Nature		
36. Reduction of morality to psychology	Yes (BGE 6; GM I:10?) ; one’s moral code is a “decisive witness to who he is”, to the “innermost drives of his nature” (BGE 6). “Moral judgments,” he says are, “symptoms and sign languages which betray the process of physiological prosperity or failure” (WP 258). “[O]ur moral judgments and evaluations...are only images and fantasies based on a physiological process unknown to us” (D 119); “it is always necessary to draw forth...the physiological phenomenon behind the moral predispositions and prejudices” (D 542); “There is only aristocracy of birth, only aristocracy of blood” (WP 942).	No (V&S, 16, pb 23; “The Psychology of ‘Psychologizing,’” TO, March 1971, 2)
37. Reduction of psychology to biology	Yes (TI 33; WP 529) ; “One cannot erase from the soul of a human being what his ancestors liked most to do and did most constantly” (BGE 260); “Descartes was the first to have dared, with admirable boldness, to understand the animal as <i>machine</i> ; the whole of our physiology endeavors to prove this claim. And we are consistent enough not to except man, as Descartes still did” (A14) ; “Wherever a deep discontent with existence becomes prevalent, it is the after-effects of some great dietary mistake made by a whole people over a long period of time that are coming to light” (JS 134)	No (GS, FNI, 148, pb 121)

38. Individual as a unity	No. The human is the combat of “a vast confusion of contradictory valuations and consequently of contradictory drives” (<i>WP</i> 259) Should strive for the dominance of one: “here the co-ordination of the inner systems and their operation in the service of one end is best achieved” (<i>WP</i> 778); “The assumption of one single subject is perhaps unnecessary” (<i>WP</i> 490); consciousness is not “the unity of the organism” (<i>JS</i> 11)	Yes. “You are an indivisible entity of matter and consciousness.” (<i>AS</i> , “Galt’s Speech”) <p>“There is no necessary clash, no dichotomy between man’s reason and his emotions—provided he observes their proper relationship. A rational man knows—or makes it a point to discover—the source of his emotions, the basic premises from which they come; if his premises are wrong, he corrects them. He never acts on emotions for which he cannot account, the meaning of which he does not understand. In appraising a situation, he knows why he reacts as he does and whether he is right. He has no inner conflicts, his mind and his emotions are integrated, his consciousness is in perfect harmony.” (“Playboy Interview,” 1964)</p>
39. Individual as real	No: “For the individual, the ‘single man,’ as people and philosophers have hitherto understood him, is an error; he does not constitute a separate entity, an atom, a ‘link in the chain,’ something merely inherited from the past—he constitutes the entire single line ‘man’ up to and including himself” (<i>TI</i> 9.33).	Yes (“The soul of an individualist,” <i>FNI</i> , 91; pb 78; “What is Capitalism,” <i>CUI</i> , 15)
40. Will as primary	Yes (<i>WP</i> 1067)	No
41. Free will	No. We are before “a brazen wall of fate; we <i>are</i> in prison, we can only <i>dream</i> ourselves free, not make ourselves free” (<i>HAH</i> 2:33). <p><i>BGE</i> 21; <i>GM</i> II:10: no “guilt,” only sickness; Postcard to Overbeck);</p> <p>“[T]he concept of a <i>causa sui</i> is something fundamentally absurd” (<i>BGE</i> 15), and that it is “the best self-contradiction that has been conceived so far ... a sort of rape and perversion of logic” (<i>BGE</i> 21); the desire for “freedom of the will” in the superlative metaphysical sense ... the desire to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility for one’s actions oneself, and to absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance, and society involves nothing less than to be precisely this <i>causa sui</i> and ... to pull oneself up into existence by the hair, out of the swamps of nothingness” (<i>BGE</i> 21);</p>	Yes: “Reason is the faculty that identifies and integrates the material provided by man’s senses. It is a faculty that man has to exercise <i>by choice</i> . Thinking is not an automatic function. In any hour and issue of his life, man is free to think or to evade that effort. Thinking requires a state of full, focused awareness. The act of focusing one’s consciousness is volitional. Man can focus his mind to a full, active, purposefully directed awareness of reality—or he can unfocus it and let himself drift in a semiconscious daze, merely reacting to any chance stimulus of the immediate moment, at the mercy of his undirected sensory-perceptual mechanism and of any random, associational connections it might happen to make.” (“The Objectivist Ethics,” <i>VOS</i> , 13, pb 21)

“at the bottom of us, really ‘deep down,’ there is, of course, something unteachable, some granite of spiritual *fatum*, of predetermined decision and answer to predetermined questions. Whenever a cardinal problem is at stake, there speaks an unchangeable ‘this is I.’ (BGE 231).

Free will is a “Great” errors (TI “The Four Great Errors” 7).

“the single human being is a piece of *fatum* from the front and from the rear, one law more, one necessity more for all that is yet to come and to be. To say to him, ‘Change yourself!’ is to demand that everything be changed, even retroactively.” (TI ‘Morality as Anti-Nature’ 6);

“the voluntary is absolutely lacking ... everything has been directed along certain lines from the beginning” (WP 458); “one will become only that which one is (in spite of all: that means education, instruction, milieu, chance, and accident)” (WP 334); “A man as he ought to be: that sounds to us as insipid as ‘a tree as he ought to be’” (WP 332). “There is only aristocracy of birth, only aristocracy of blood” (WP 942);

“perhaps there exists neither will nor purposes, and we have only imagined them. Those iron hands of necessity which shake the dice-box of chance play their game for an infinite length of time; so there *have* to be throws which exactly resemble purposiveness and rationality of every degree. *Perhaps* our acts of will and our purposes are nothing but just such throws—and we are only too limited and too vain to comprehend our extreme limitedness: which consists in the fact that we ourselves shake the dice-box with iron hands, that we ourselves in our most intentional actions do no more than play the game of necessity.” (D 130)

Opening line of EH: “The good fortune of my existence ‘lies in its fatality.’” (EH ‘Why I am so Wise’, 1)
“It was a lucky fact of nature that I,

	<p>Nietzsche, was a healthy organism, that is, the type of creature that instinctively does the right things to facilitate its flourishing.” (<i>EH</i> ‘Why I am so Wise’, 2); “<i>Amor fati</i>: Let that be my love henceforth!” (<i>JS</i> 276)</p> <p>Stoic fatalism? One controls only one’s response to one’s fate?</p> <p>Yes: “We ... want to become those we are—human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves.” (<i>JS</i> 335)</p>	
42. Reason and passion/emotion priority	<p>Passion/emotion has priority (<i>BGE</i> 36, 68, 158, 191) Thinking is only “the form in which we come to feel” (<i>JS</i> 333). “Thoughts are the shadows of our feelings—always darker, emptier, and simpler.” (<i>JS</i> 179)</p>	<p>Reason primary. “Man is born with an emotional mechanism, just as he is born with a cognitive mechanism; but, at birth, <i>both</i> are “tabula rasa.” It is man’s cognitive faculty, his mind, that determines the <i>content</i> of both. Man’s emotional mechanism is like an electronic computer, which his mind has to program—and the programming consists of the values his mind chooses.” (<i>VoS</i>, “The Objectivist Ethics,” 27)</p> <p>Also: “The Left: Old and New,” <i>NL</i>, 84; “<i>Playboy</i>’s Interview with Ayn Rand,” pamphlet, 6)</p>
43. Reason and passion/emotion relationship	<p>Conflict (<i>EH</i>: “The Birth of Tragedy” 1): “‘Rationality’ against instinct”)</p> <p>Hayman on <i>JS</i> 55: The noble individual does not proceed according to reason: when he is magnanimous or self-sacrificing, it is his instincts he is following, and when he is brave it is not for the sake of winning honours. His overflowing magnanimity empowers him to be generous.” (237)</p>	<p>Should be harmony (“<i>Playboy</i>’s Interview with Ayn Rand,” pamphlet, 6)</p>
44. <i>Tabula rasa</i> or nativism	<p>Strong nativism (<i>BGE</i> 231, 264) ;</p> <p>Self-creation: “<i>The one thing needful</i>. – There is one thing one has to have: either a cheerful disposition by nature of a <i>disposition made cheerful</i> by art and knowledge.” (<i>HAH</i> 486)</p>	<p>Cognitive and moral <i>tabula rasa</i> (<i>VoS</i>, 23, pb 28; “The Comprachios,” <i>NL</i>, 190)</p>
45. Science as ennobling	<p>No: “all science ... has at present the object of dissuading man from his</p>	<p>Yes: “The Renaissance—the rebirth of man’s mind—blasted the rule of the Witch-Doctor [mystics] sky-high, setting the <i>earth</i> free of his</p>

	<p>former respect for himself ...” (<i>GM</i> III:25)</p> <p>Yes: (<i>JS</i> 293).</p>	<p>power. The liberation was not total, nor was it immediate: the convulsions lasted for centuries, but the <i>cultural</i> influence of mysticism—of avowed mysticism—was broken. Men could no longer be told to reject their mind as an impotent tool, when the proof of its potency was so magnificently evident that the lowest perceptual-level mentality was not able fully to evade it: men were seeing the achievements of <i>science</i>.” (<i>FNI</i>, “For the New Intellectual,” 21-22)</p> <p>“By the grace of Aristotle, of Galileo, of Pasteur, of Edison, and of a long, thin line of often-martyred men stretching back through millennia ...” (<i>NL</i>, “The Left: Old and New,” 88)</p>
<i>Ethics</i>		
46. Morality in the service of life	<p>Yes: “under what conditions did man devise these value judgments good and evil? and what value do they themselves possess? Have they hitherto hindered or furthered human prosperity? Are they a sign of distress, of impoverishment, of the degeneration of life? Or is there revealed in them, on the contrary, the plenitude, force, and will of life, its courage, certainty, future? (<i>GM</i>, “Preface” 3)</p>	<p>Yes: “The standard of value of the Objectivist ethics—the standard by which one judges what is good or evil—is <i>man’s</i> life, or: that which is required for man’s survival <i>qua</i> man.” (<i>VoS</i>, “The Objectivist Ethics,” pb 23)</p>
47. Psychological egoism	<p>Yes (<i>BGE</i>); “Is it virtuous when a cell transforms itself into a function of a stronger cell? It has no alternative. Is it evil when a stronger cell assimilates the weaker? It also has no alternative; it follows necessity ...” (<i>JS</i> 118)</p> <p>No: “For what does one have to atone most? For one’s modesty; for having failed to listen to one’s most personal requirements; for having mistaken oneself; for having underestimated oneself; for having lost a good war for one’s instincts: this lack of reverence for oneself revenges itself through every kind of deprivation: health, friendship, well-being, pride, cheerfulness, freedom, firmness, courage. One never afterward forgives oneself for this lack of genuine egoism: one takes it for an</p>	<p>No (“Introduction,” <i>VoS</i>, xiii, pb ix)</p>

	objection, for a doubt about a real ego.” (<i>WP</i> 918)	
48. Psychological altruism	<p>Yes: “‘Not to seek one’s own advantage’—that is merely the moral fig leaf for quite a different, namely, a physiological state of affairs: ‘I no longer know how to <i>find</i> my own advantage.’ Disintegration of the instincts! Man is finished when he becomes altruistic. Instead of saying naïvely, “<i>I am no longer worth anything,</i>’ the moral lie in the mouth of the decadent says, ‘Nothing is worth anything, life is not worth anything.’ Such a judgment always remains very dangerous, it is contagious: throughout the morbid soil of society it soon proliferates into a tropical vegetation of concepts—now as a religion (Christianity), now as a philosophy (Schopenhaurism).” (<i>TI</i> “Skirmishes” 35)</p> <p>Yes: <i>JS</i> 119 speaks of those who desire only to be a function of others.</p> <p>The above two as representative of N’s descriptive and normative uses of the same concepts: third-person description of the phenomenon and first-person evaluation of the phenomenon from the perspective of his moral-psycho-biological type.</p> <p>Nietzsche has two theses: 1. Egoism as universal and natural. All have will to power. But not all are equal. So altruism as the egoism of the weak. 2. Egoism as not universal: physiological sickness causes a will to nothingness and then moral nihilism. Altruism as the will to nothingness of the weak. Which is it—1 or 2?</p>	No.
49. Conflict of interest the fundamental social fact	<p>Yes: “Here one must think profoundly to the very basis and resist all sentimental weakness: life itself is <i>essentially</i> appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of peculiar forms, incorporation and at the least, putting it mildest, exploitation—but why should one for ever use precisely these words</p>	No: Reason and production increase value; Reason and emotion harmonizable.

	<p>on which for ages a disparaging purpose has been stamped?” “[P]eople now rave everywhere, even under the guise of science, about coming conditions of society in which 'the exploiting character' is to be absent:—that sounds to my ear as if they promised to invent a mode of life which should refrain from all organic functions.” (<i>BGE</i> 259).</p> <p>Will to power “can manifest itself only against resistances; therefore it seeks that which resists it” (<i>WP</i> 656) .</p> <p>“The well-being of the majority and the well-being of the few are opposite viewpoints of value,” (<i>GM</i> , end of First Essay note).</p> <p>“There is no egoism that remains by itself and does not encroach ‘One furthers one’s I always at the expense of others’” ; alternative translation:</p> <p>“‘One furthers one’s ego always at the expense of others’ (<i>WP</i> 369) ; (cf. <i>BGE</i> 265).</p>	
50. Inequalities of power as key social fact	<p>Yes: Life is “defined as an enduring form of processes of the establishment of force, in which the different contenders grow unequally” (<i>WP</i> 642)</p>	<p>No. “ ‘Equality,’ in a human context, is a political term: it means equality before the law, the equality of fundamental, inalienable rights which every man possesses by virtue of his birth as a human being, and which may not be infringed or abrogated by man-made institutions, such as titles of nobility or the division of men into castes established by law, with special privileges granted to some and denied to others.” (<i>NL</i>, “The Age of Envy”</p>
51. Values as intrinsic	<p>No (<i>GM</i> I:10)</p>	<p>No. “There are, in essence, three schools of thought on the nature of the good: the intrinsic, the subjective, and the objective. The <i>intrinsic</i> theory holds that the good is inherent in certain things or actions as such, regardless of their context and consequences, regardless of any benefit or injury they may cause to the actors and subjects involved. It is a theory that divorces the concept of “good” from beneficiaries, and the concept of “value” from valuer and purpose—claiming that the good is good in, by, and of itself.”</p> <p>Further: “If a man believes that the good is intrinsic in certain actions, he will not hesitate to force others to perform them. If he believes</p>

		that the human benefit or injury caused by such actions is of no significance, he will regard a sea of blood as of no significance. If he believes that the beneficiaries of such actions are irrelevant (or interchangeable), he will regard wholesale slaughter as his moral duty in the service of a “higher” good. It is the intrinsic theory of values that produces a Robespierre, a Lenin, a Stalin, or a Hitler. It is not an accident that Eichmann was a Kantian.” (“What is Capitalism,” CUI, 21-22)
52. Values as objective	No:	<p>Yes: “The concept of objectivity contains the reason why the question “Who decides what is right or wrong?” is wrong. Nobody “decides.” Nature does not decide—it merely is; man does not decide, in issues of knowledge, he merely observes that which is. When it comes to applying his knowledge, man decides what he chooses to do, according to what he has learned, remembering that the basic principle of rational action in all aspects of human existence, is: “Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.” This means that man does not create reality and can achieve his values only by making his decisions consonant with the facts of reality.’ (<i>TON</i>, “Who Is the Final Authority in Ethics?” February 1965, 7)</p> <p>Also: <i>VOS</i>; “What is Capitalism,” <i>CUI</i>, 22)</p>
53. Values as subjective	<p>Yes: “Whatever has value in our world now does not have value in itself, according to its nature—nature is always value-less, but has been given value at some time” (<i>JS</i> 301);</p> <p>One’s moral code is a “decisive witness to who he is”, to the “innermost drives of his nature” (<i>BGE</i> 6).</p> <p>“Moral judgments are symptoms and sign languages which betray the process of physiological prosperity or failure” (<i>WP</i> 258).</p> <p>“[O]ur moral judgments and evaluations...are only images and fantasies based on a physiological process unknown to us” (<i>D</i> 119).</p> <p>“it is always necessary to draw forth...the physiological phenomenon behind the moral predispositions and prejudices” (<i>D</i> 542).</p>	<p>No: “Today, as in the past, most philosophers agree that the ultimate standard of ethics is whim (they call it “arbitrary postulate” or “subjective choice” or “emotional commitment”)—and the battle is only over the question of whose whim: one’s own or society’s or the dictator’s or God’s. Whatever else they may disagree about, today’s moralists agree that ethics is a subjective issue and that the three things barred from its field are: reason—mind—reality.</p> <p>“If you wonder why the world is now collapsing to a lower and ever lower rung of hell, this is the reason.” (<i>VoS</i>, “The Objectivist Ethics,” 15)</p> <p>Also: “What is Capitalism,” <i>CUI</i>, 22.</p>

	<p>“justice ... is by all means a matter of taste, nothing more” (<i>JS</i> 184).</p> <p>“The noble type of man experiences itself as determining values; it does not need approval.” (<i>BGE</i> 260)</p>	
54. Values as universal	<p>No. Slave morality is “the prudence of the lowest order” (<i>GM</i> I:13).</p> <p>“The ideas of the herd should rule in the herd—but not reach out beyond it” (<i>WP</i> 287)</p> <p>“That lambs dislike great birds of prey does not seem strange: only it gives no grounds for reproaching these birds of prey for bearing off little lambs. And if the lambs say among themselves: ‘these birds of prey are evil; and whoever is least like a bird of prey, but rather its opposite, a lamb—would he not be good?’ there is no reason to find fault with this institution of an ideal, except perhaps that the birds of prey might view it a little ironically and say: ‘we don't dislike them at all, these good little lambs; we even love them: nothing is more tasty than a tender lamb.’” (<i>GM</i> I:13)</p> <p>“Not one of these clumsy, conscience-stricken herd animals (who set out to treat egoism as a matter of general welfare) wants to know ... that what is right for someone <i>absolutely</i> cannot be right for someone else; that the requirement that there be a single morality for everyone is harmful precisely to the higher men; in short, that there is an <i>order of rank</i> between people, and between moralities as well. (<i>BGE</i> 228)</p>	Yes.
55. Value/virtue relationship	Priority of virtue. Values created by characters of a type.	Priority of value.
56. Virtue	<p>“And verily I do not even teach that virtue is its own reward.... You are <i>too pure</i> to be sullied with the words revenge, punishment, reward, retribution. You love your virtue, as a mother does her child, and whoever heard of a mother wanting to be paid</p>	Virtues as means to value ends.

	<p>for her love? Your virtue is your self, not something alien.” (Z “On the Virtuous”)</p> <p>N’s is an <i>activist</i> Stoicism. A cheerful <i>Byronic</i> fatalism.</p>	
57. Individuals responsible for their characters	<p>No. “One cannot erase from the soul of a human being what his ancestors liked most to do and did most constantly” (BGE 264).</p> <p>“Weakness of the will: that is a simile that can mislead. For there is no will, and consequently neither a strong nor a weak will. The multiplicity and disgregation of the impulses, the lack of system among them results in a ‘weak will’; their coordination under the dominance of a single one results in a ‘strong will’” (WP 46).</p>	Yes: “Man is a being of self-made soul.”
58. Individuals responsible for their actions	No and yes. See Free will.	Yes (“Causality versus Duty,” PWN I, 118, pb 98)
59. Individuals as ends in themselves	<p>Yes (BGE 287);</p> <p>No (WP 287); every living being “is only a <i>means</i> to something; it is the expression of forms of the growth of power” (WP 706)</p> <p>“A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength—life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent results” (BGE 13)</p> <p>Every “living creature values many things higher than life itself; yet out of this evaluation itself speaks—the will to power” (Z 2:12).</p> <p>“Not ‘mankind’ but <i>overman</i> is the goal!” (WP 1001)</p> <p>Morality is a social product: it arises “when a greater individual or a collective-individual, for example the society, the state, subjugates all other single ones ... and orders them into a unit.” (HH 1.99)</p>	Yes. “Man—every man—is an end in himself, not the means to the ends of others. He must exist for his own sake, neither sacrificing himself to others nor sacrificing others to himself. The pursuit of his own rational self-interest and of his own happiness is the highest moral purpose of his life.” (AS “About the Author” Appendix)
60. Individual life as the purpose	No (BGE 188); “Beginning with Socrates, the individual all at once	Yes (“The Soul of an Individualist,” FNI, 96, pb 82; “Racism,” VOS, 176, pb 129); (VOS, 7, pb 17).

	<p>began to take himself too seriously” (<i>SSW</i> 132).</p> <p>“My philosophy aims at ordering of rank not at an individualistic morality” (<i>WP</i> 287).</p> <p>“For the question is this: how can your life, the individual life, retain the highest value, the deepest significance? ... Only by your living for the good of the rarest and most valuable specimens and not for the good of the majority.” (<i>SE</i>)</p> <p>The free spirit: “Such a spirit who has <i>become free</i> stands amid the cosmos with a joyous and trusting fatalism, in the <i>faith</i> that only the particular is loathsome, and that all is redeemed and affirmed in the whole—<i>he does not negate any more</i>. Such a faith, however, is the highest of all possible faiths: I have baptized it with the name of <i>Dionysus</i>.” (<i>TI</i> Skirmishes 49)</p> <p><i>HH</i> 2.89: community more valuable than individual, and to create that which is enduring is the goal; morality is for that purpose: to limit and channel the individual. This, e.g., was the great accomplishment of the Roman Empire (<i>A</i> 58)</p> <p>“That feeling by which the process of procreation is considered as something shamefacedly to be hidden, although by it man serves a higher purpose than his individual preservation, the same feeling veiled also the origin of the great works of art, in spite of the fact that through them a higher form of existence is inaugurated, just as through that other act comes a new generation. The feeling of shame seems therefore to occur where man is merely a tool of manifestations of will infinitely greater than he is permitted to consider himself in the isolated shape of the individual.” (<i>TGS</i>)</p>	<p>Roark on creating each building, whether small or large: “I love doing it. Every building is like a person. Single and unrepeatable.” (<i>F</i>, Part 3)</p>
61. Human life as the standard	<p>No: “Those who care most today ask: ‘How are human beings to be preserved?’ But Zarathustra is the only one and the first one to ask: ‘How shall human being be <i>overcome</i>?’ The overman</p>	<p>Yes” “The Objectivist ethics holds man’s life as the standard of value—and his own life as the ethical purpose of every individual man. ...</p> <p>“Man must choose his actions, values and goals by the standard of that which is proper to</p>

	is in my heart, that is my first and my only concern—and <i>not</i> human beings Oh my brothers, what I am able to love in human beings is that they are a going over and a going under.” (Z IV “On the Higher Man”)	man—in order to achieve, maintain, fulfill and enjoy that ultimate value, that end in itself, which is his own life.” (VOS, “The Objectivist Ethics,” 25)
62. Sacrificin g self to others	Yes, if a weakling (TI 33). Zarathustra says: “The overman is the sense of the earth I love those who sacrifice themselves for the earth, that the earth may some day become the overman’s.” (Z I.P.3)	No (GS, FNI, 172; pb 139)
63. Sacrificin g others to self	Yes, if strong (WP 369, 982). “To ordinary human beings, finally—the vast majority who exist for service and the general advantage, and who <i>may</i> exist only for that” (BGE 61). “egoism belongs to the nature of a noble soul—I mean that unshakable faith that to a being such as ‘we are’ other beings must be subordinate by nature and have to sacrifice themselves.” (BGE 265)	No: “It stands to reason that where there’s sacrifice, there’s someone collecting sacrificial offerings. Where there’s service, there’s someone being served. The man who speaks to you of sacrifice, speaks of slaves and masters. And intends to be the master.” (F, 638) Also: “Introduction,” VOS, xii, pb ix)
64. The improvement of the species as the end	Yes: “mankind in the mass sacrificed to the prosperity of a single stronger species of man — that would be an advance.” (GM II:12) “Behold, I teach you the overman. The overman is the meaning of the earth. Let your will say: the overman shall be the meaning of the earth!” (Z, Prologue, 3). “I write for a species of man that does not yet exist: for the ‘masters of the earth’” (WP 958) (BGE 126; Z Prologue: 4)	No. “My philosophy, in essence, is the concept of man as a heroic being, with his own happiness as the moral purpose of his life, with productive achievement as his noblest activity, and reason as his only absolute.” (AS “About the Author” Appendix)
65. Sacrificin g some for the sake of the species	Yes (BGE 62; WP 246; GM II:12). “All-too-many live, and all-too-long they hang on their branches. Would that a storm came to shake all this worm-eaten rot from the tree!” (Z, First Part). A healthy aristocracy “accepts with a good conscience the sacrifice of untold human beings, who, <i>for its sake</i> , must be reduced and lowered to incomplete	No: “Collectivism holds that the individual has no rights, that his life and work belong to the group ... and that the group may sacrifice him at its own whim to its own interests. The only way to implement a doctrine of that kind is by means of brute force—and statism has always been the political corollary of collectivism.” (VOS, “Racism,” 128)

	<p>human beings, to slaves, to instruments” (<i>BGE</i> 258).</p> <p>“a conqueror- and master-race which, organized for war and with the force to organize unhesitatingly lays its terrible claws upon a populace perhaps tremendously superior in numbers but still formless and wandering.” (<i>GM</i> II:17)</p> <p>N seeks “a noble mode of thought ... that believes in slavery and in many degrees of subjection as the presupposition of every higher culture” (<i>WP</i> 464);</p> <p>N wonders “to what extent a sacrifice of freedom, even enslavement itself, gives the basis for the bringing-forth of a <i>higher type</i>.” (<i>WP</i> 859)</p>	
66. Power as the end	<p>As means and end (<i>WP</i> 1067); “What is good?—All that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man.” (<i>A</i> 1?) “A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength — life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent results” (<i>BGE</i> 13); “All that happens out of aims is reducible to the <i>aim of increasing power</i>.” (<i>WP</i> 663)</p> <p>“the <i>feeling of power</i>: this wants to <i>express itself</i>, either to us ourselves, or to other men, or to ideas or imaginary beings. The most common modes of expression are: to bestow, to mock, to destroy—all three out of a common basic drive” (<i>D</i> 356)</p>	<p>As means only.</p> <p>“An animal’s capacity for development ends at physical maturity and thereafter its growth consists of the action necessary to maintain itself at a fixed level; after reaching maturity, it does not, to any significant extent, continue to grow in efficacy But man’s capacity for development does not end at physical maturity His ability to think, to learn, to discover new and better ways of dealing with reality, to expand the range of his efficacy, to grow intellectually, is an open door to a road that has no end.” (<i>IOE</i> 81?)</p>
67. Happiness as the end	No	Yes (<i>VOS</i> , 25, pb 29; <i>GS</i> , <i>FNI</i> , 150, pb 123)
68. Egoism as good	<p>Depends: “<i>The natural value of egoism</i>. Self-interest is worth as much as the person who has it: in can be worth a great deal, and it can be unworthy and contemptible. Every individual may be scrutinized to see whether he represents the ascending or the descending line of life. Having made that decision, one has a canon for the worth of his self-interest. If he represents the ascending line, then his worth is indeed</p>	Yes (“The Soul of an Individualist,” <i>FNI</i> , 94, pb 81)

	<p>extraordinary—and for the sake of life as a whole, which takes a step farther through him, the care for his preservation and for the creation of the best conditions for him may even be extreme. The single one, the ‘individual,’ as hitherto understood by the people and the philosophers alike, is an error after all: he is nothing by himself, no atom, no ‘link in the chain,’ nothing merely inherited from former times; he is the whole single line of humanity up to himself. If he represents the descending development, decay, chronic degeneration, and sickness (sicknesses are, in general, the consequences of decay, not its causes), then he has small worth, and the minimum of decency requires that he take away as little as possible from those who have turned out well. He is merely their parasite.” (<i>TI Skimishes</i> 33)</p> <p>“[T]he subject—the striving individual bent on furthering his egoistic purposes—can be thought of only as the enemy of art, never its source.” (<i>BT</i> 5)</p> <p>Egoism among noble equals: “It is one piece of its egoism <i>more</i>, this refinement and self-limitation with its equals ... — it honors <i>itself</i> in them and in the rights it cedes to them.” (<i>BGE</i> 265)</p> <p>“At the risk of annoying innocent ears I will propose this: egoism belongs to the essence of the noble soul. I mean that firm belief that other beings will, by nature, have to be subordinate to a being ‘like us’ and will have to sacrifice themselves. The noble soul accepts this fact of its egoism without any question-mark, and also without feeling any harshness, compulsion, or caprice in it, but rather as something that may well be grounded in the primordial law of things. If the noble soul were to try to name this phenomenon, it would call it justice itself” (<i>BGE</i> 265)</p>	
69. Altruism as bad	Yes (<i>TI Skirmishes</i> 35); depends (<i>TI Skirmishes</i> 33)	Yes: “The basic principle of altruism is that man has no right to exist for his own sake, that service to others is the only justification of his

	<p>“Morality trains the individual to be a function of the herd and to ascribe value to himself only as a function.” (<i>JS</i> 116)</p> <p>“<i>No altruism!</i>” (<i>JS</i> 119)</p>	<p>existence, and that self-sacrifice is his highest moral duty, virtue and value.</p> <p>“Do not confuse altruism with kindness, good will or respect for the rights of others. The irreducible primary of altruism, the basic absolute, is self-sacrifice—which means; self-immolation, self-abnegation, self-denial, self-destruction—which means: the self as a standard of evil, the selfless as a standard of the good.” (<i>PWNI</i>, “Faith and Force ...” 61)</p> <p>Also: Galt’s Speech, <i>FNI</i>, 178, pb 144; <i>VOS</i>, 33, pb 34, and xii, pb ix)</p>
70. Altruism as the egoism of the weak	Yes (<i>GM</i> I:8, III:14).	Ultimately, no. But used as a weapon by the weak (<i>AS</i> 142: D’Anconia’s warning to Rearden)
71. Rationality as a virtue	No (<i>EH</i> : “Birth of Tragedy” 1)	Primary virtue (<i>GS</i> , <i>FNI</i> , 157, pb 128)
72. Selflessness	<p>Last men as disgusting: “What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?” thus asks the last man, and he blinks.</p> <p>The earth has become small, and on it hops the last man, who makes everything small. His race is as in eradicable as the flea-beetle; the last man lives longest.</p> <p>“We have invented happiness,’ say the last men, and they blink” (<i>Z P</i>:5)</p> <p>“Pseudo-egoism.—Whatever they may think and say about their ‘egoism’, the great majority nonetheless do nothing for their ego their whole life long: what they do is done for the phantom of their ego which has formed itself in the heads of those around them and has been communicated to them;—as a consequence they all of them dwell in a fog of impersonal, semi-personal opinions, and arbitrary, as it were poetical evaluations, the one for ever in the head of someone else, and the head of this someone else again in the heads of others: a strange world of phantasms” (<i>D</i> 105)</p>	<p>Second-handers as disgusting. E.g., Peter Keating.</p> <p>“Men have been taught that the ego is the synonym of evil, and selflessness the ideal of virtue. But the creator is the egoist in the absolute sense, and the selfless man is the one who does not think, feel, judge or act. These are functions of the self.” (<i>FNI</i>, “The Soul of an Individualist,” 81).</p> <p>“When you are in love, it means that the person you love is of great personal, selfish importance to you and to your life. If you were selfless, it would have to mean that you derive no personal pleasure or happiness from the company and the existence of the person you love, and that you are motivated only by self-sacrificial pity for that person’s need of you. I don’t have to point out to you that no one would be flattered by, nor would accept, a concept of that kind. Love is not self-sacrifice, but the most profound assertion of your <i>own</i> needs and values. It is for your own happiness that you need the person you love, and that is the greatest compliment, the greatest tribute you can pay to that person.” (“Playboy Interview: Ayn Rand,” <i>Playboy</i>, March 1964)</p>

73. Self-esteem	He who “flees from himself, hates himself, does harm to himself—he is certainly not a good man” (<i>D</i> 516)	
74. What makes an individual good	<p>“<i>One thing is needful.</i>—To ‘give style’ to one’s character—a great and rare art! In the end, when the work is finished, it becomes evident how the constraint of a single taste governed and formed everything large and small. Whether this taste was good or bad is less important than one might suppose, if only it was a single taste!” (<i>JS</i> 290) [The aesthetic choice out of Kierkegaard’s trichotomy.]</p> <p>The “‘great man’ is great owing to the free play and scope of his desires and to the yet greater power that knows how to press these magnificent monsters into service” (<i>WP</i> 933) An <i>actor</i> (not a re-actor).</p> <p>“... one could conceive of such a pleasure and power of self-determination, such a freedom of the will that the spirit would take leave of all faith and every wish for certainty, being practiced in maintaining himself on insubstantial ropes and possibilities and dancing even near abysses. Such a spirit would be the free spirit par excellence” (<i>JS</i> 347).</p> <p>Zarathustra says: “The overman is the sense of the earth I love those who sacrifice themselves for the earth, that the earth may some day become the overman’s.” (<i>Z</i> I.P.3)</p> <p>“The essential point is: the greatest perhaps also have great virtues, but in that case also their opposites. I believe that it is precisely through the presence of opposites, and their feelings, that the great human being, <i>the bow with the great tension</i>, arises.” (<i>WP</i> 967) [Hegelian]</p> <p>“<i>What makes one heroic?</i>—Going out to meet at the same time one’s highest suffering and one’s highest hope.” (<i>JS</i> 268)</p> <p>“<i>Greek ideal.</i>—What did the Greeks admire in Odysseus? Above all, his</p>	<p>“As man is a being of self-made wealth, so he is a being of self-made soul.” (<i>AS</i>, Galt’s Speech)</p> <p>Commitment to three core values: Reason, Purpose, Self esteem. (<i>VOS</i>)</p>

	<p>capacity for lying, and for cunning and terrible retribution; his being equal to contingencies; when the need be, appearing nobler than the noblest; the ability to be <i>whatever he chose</i>; heroic perseverance; having all means at his command; possession of intellect—his intellect is the admiration of the gods, they smile when they think of it--: all this is the Greek <i>ideal</i>!” (D, 306)</p> <p>“<i>What belongs to greatness</i>—Who will attain something great if he does not feel in himself the power to inflict great pain? Being able to suffer is the least; weak women and even slaves often achieve mastery at that. But not to perish of inner distress and uncertainty when one inflicts great suffering and hears the cry of this suffering—that is great; that belongs to greatness.” (JS 325)</p>	
75. What makes an individual bad	<p>One who is a “multitude and digression of impulses ... [that] lack ... systematic order among them” (WP 46). Such a man is “inner ruin ... and anarchism” (WP 778) A <i>re-actor</i>.</p>	<p>Evasion: “Thinking is man’s only basic virtue, from which all the others proceed. And his basic vice, the source of all his evils, is that nameless act which all of you practice, but struggle never to admit: the act of blanking out, the willful suspension of one’s consciousness, the refusal to think—not blindness, but the refusal to see; not ignorance, but the refusal to know. It is the act of unfocusing your mind and inducing an inner fog to escape the responsibility of judgment—on the unstated premise that a thing will not exist if only you refuse to identify it, that A will not be A so long as you do not pronounce the verdict ‘It is.] Non-thinking is an act of annihilation, a wish to negate existence, an attempt to wipe out reality. But existence exists; reality is not to be wiped out, it will merely wipe out the wiper. By refusing to say ‘It is,’ you are refusing to say ‘I am.’ By suspending your judgment, you are negating your person. When a man declares: ‘Who am I to know?’ he is declaring: ‘Who am I to live?’” (AS, Galt’s Speech)</p>
76. Morality as relative to psychological type	<p>Yes (BGE 221) ; “the <i>physiological</i> phenomenon behind the moral predispositions and prejudices” (D 542)</p>	<p>No (GS, FNI, 156, pb 128; VOS, 16, pb 23)</p>

<p>77. The greatest danger to man?</p>	<p>The weak: "The sick represent the greatest danger for the healthy; it is not the strongest but the weakest who spell disaster for the strong." Why? "What is to be feared, what has a more calamitous effect than any other calamity, is that man should inspire not profound fear but profound nausea; also not great fear but great pity." (<i>GM</i> III:14)</p> <p>"What was especially at stake was the value of the 'unegoistic,' the instincts of pity, self-abnegation, self-sacrifice, which Schopenhauer had gilded, deified, and projected into a beyond for so long that at last they became for him 'value-in-itself,' on the basis of which he said No to life and to himself. But it was against precisely these instincts that there spoke from me an ever more fundamental mistrust, an ever more corrosive skepticism! It was precisely here that I saw the great danger to mankind, its sublimest enticement and seduction—but to what? to nothingness?" (<i>GM</i>, "Preface" 5)</p>	<p>The strong via sanction of the victim? E.g., Francisco D'Anconia's claim that his greatest battle is against Dagny Taggart.</p> <p>The weapon of altruism (<i>AS</i> 142)</p>
<p>78. Virtues: Authenticity versus second-handers</p>	<p>"Are you genuine? Or merely an actor? A representative? Or that which is represented? In the end, perhaps you are merely a copy of an actor." (<i>TI</i> Maxims and Arrows 38)</p>	<p>Howard Roark vs. Peter Keating (<i>F</i>).</p> <p>Keating: "The hall was packed with bodies and faces, so tightly packed that one could not distinguish at a glance which faces belonged to which bodies. It was like a soft, shivering aspic made of mixed arms, shoulders, chests, and stomachs. One of the heads, pale, dark haired and beautiful belonged to Peter Keating.</p> <p>"He sat, well in front, trying to keep his eyes on the platform because he knew that many people were looking at him and would look at him later. He did not glance back, but the consciousness of those centered glances never left him." (<i>F</i> I.2)</p> <p>Roark: "an honest building, like an honest man, had to be of one piece and one faith; what constituted the life source, the idea in any existing thing or creature, and why—if one small part committed treason to that idea—the thing or the creature was dead; and why the good, the high and the noble on earth was only that which kept its integrity" (<i>F</i> I.15)</p>

<p>79. Morality not as commands but as tools of living creatively</p>	<p>Yes: “We should be <i>able</i> also to stand <i>above</i> morality—and not only to <i>stand</i> with the anxious stiffness of a man who is afraid of slipping and falling any moment, but also to <i>float</i> above it and <i>play</i>.” (JS 107)</p>	<p>Yes. “that which is proper to the life of a rational being is the good; that which negates, opposes or destroys it is the evil. Since everything man needs has to be discovered by his own mind and produced by his own effort, the two essentials of the method of survival proper to a rational being are: thinking and productive work.” (VOS, “The Objectivist Ethics,” 23)</p> <p>Anti-duty: “One of the most destructive anti-concepts in the history of moral philosophy is the term ‘duty.’</p> <p>“An anti-concept is an artificial, unnecessary and rationally unusable term designed to replace and obliterate some legitimate concept. ...</p> <p>“The meaning of the term ‘duty’ is: the moral necessity to perform certain actions for no reason other than obedience to some higher authority, without regard to any personal goal, motive, desire or interest.” (PWNI, “Causality Versus Duty,” 95)</p>
<p>80. Contemporary moral philosophy as essentially Judeo-Christian</p>	<p>Yes: “everything is visibly becoming Judaized, Christianized, mob-ized.” (GM I.9)</p> <p>“You are incapable of seeing something that required two thousand years to achieve victory?” (GM I.8)</p>	<p>“The greatest treason of the philosophers was that they never stepped out of the Middle Ages: they never challenged the Witch Doctor’s code of morality.” (FNI 37)</p>
<p>81. <i>Ressentiment</i> and envy</p>	<p>“The slave revolt in morality begins when <i>ressentiment</i> itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: the <i>ressentiment</i> of natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge.” (GM I.10)</p>	<p>“They do not want to own your fortune, they want you to lose it; they do not want to succeed, they want you to fail; they do not want to live, they want you to die; they desire nothing, they hate existence, and they keep running, each trying not to learn that the object of his hatred is himself <i>They</i> are the essence of evil, they, those anti-living objects who seek, by devouring the world, to fill the <i>selfless</i> zero of their soul. It is not your wealth that they’re after. Theirs is a conspiracy against the mind, which means: against life and man.” (AS, Galt’s Speech)</p> <p>Also: “The Age of Envy,” TO, July-August 1971, pp. 1057-</p>
<p>82. Wealth and virtue</p>	<p>Wealth creates virtue: “<i>Wealth as the Origin of a Nobility of Birth</i>. —Wealth necessarily engenders an aristocracy of race, for it permits one to select the fairest women, pay the best teachers, grants to a man cleanliness, time for</p>	<p>Virtue creates wealth.</p>

	<p>physical exercises, an above all freedom from deadening labour. To this extent it creates all the conditions for the production over a few generations of a noble and fair demeanour, even noble and fair behaviour, in men: greater freedom of feeling, the absence of the wretched and petty, of abasement before breadgivers, of penny-pinching.” (HLAH 479)</p>	
83. Work and leisure	<p>“There is an Indian savagery, a savagery peculiar to the American Indian blood, in the manner in which Americans strive for gold; and the breathless haste with which they work—the original vice of the New World—has already begun to infect old Europe with its savagery, spreading over it a quite remarkable spiritlessness.” (JS 329)</p> <p>Leisure highest: “<i>Leisure and idleness</i>: ... More and more, <i>work</i> gets all good conscience on its side; the desire for joy already calls itself a ‘need to recuperate’ and is starting to be ashamed of itself. ‘One owes it to one’s health’—that is what one says when caught on an excursion in the countryside. Soon we may well reach the point where one can’t give in to the desire for a <i>vita contemplativa</i> (that is, taking a walk with ideas and friends) without self-contempt and a bad conscience. Well, formerly it was the other way around: work was afflicted with a bad conscience. A person of good family <i>concealed</i> the fact that he worked if need compelled him to work.” (JS 329)</p>	<p>Work highest: “Productive work is the central purpose of a rational man’s life, the central value that integrates and determines the hierarchy of all his other values. Reason is the source, the precondition of his productive work—pride is the result.” (VS, “The Objectivist Ethics,”25)</p>
84. Human life as significant	<p>No. “Man is a minor, transitional animal species, which—fortunately—has had its day. Anyway, life on earth is but a moment, an incident, an exception without consequence, something which is irrelevant to the general character of the earth; the earth itself, like every star, is a hiatus between nothingness and nothingness, an event without plan, reason, will, or self-awareness, the worst kind of necessity: <i>blind</i> necessity. . . . Something in us rebels against this view; the serpent ‘vanity’ says to us, ‘All this</p>	<p>Yes, as most significant. “My philosophy, in essence, is the concept of man as a heroic being, with his own happiness as the moral purpose of his life, with productive achievement as his noblest activity, and reason as his only absolute.” (AS, “About the Author”)</p>

	<p>must be wrong <i>because</i> it is outrageous. . . Could not all this be appearance? And, to speak with Kant, [could not] man despite all this [be something transcendent?]" (<i>WP</i> 303, R. Kevin Hill translation)</p>	
<i>Social and Political</i>		
85. Individual rights	<p>No. "For the preservation of society, for making possible higher and highest types—the <i>inequality</i> of rights is the condition." (<i>A</i> 57)</p> <p>"Their [i.e., the healthy's] right to exist, the privilege of the full-toned bell over the false and cracked, is a thousand times greater: they alone are our warranty for the future, they alone are liable for the future of man." (<i>GM</i> III:14)</p> <p>"The invalid is a parasite on society. In a certain state it is indecent to go on living." (<i>TI</i> Skirmishes 36)</p>	<p>Yes: "A 'right' is a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man's freedom of action in a social context. There is only one fundamental right (all the others are its consequences or corollaries): a man's right to his own life. Life is a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action; the right to life means the right to engage in self-sustaining and self-generated action—which means: the freedom to take all the actions required by the nature of a rational being for the support, the furtherance, the fulfillment and the enjoyment of his own life. (Such is the meaning of the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.)" (<i>VOS</i>, "Man's Rights," 124, pb 93)</p>
86. On capitalism	<p>Dehumanizing for most (<i>D</i> 206).</p> <p>Extreme inequality of wealth harmful to society. Financial markets and transportation should not be in private hands (<i>WS</i> 285).</p> <p>Work and trade (<i>JS</i> 31)</p>	<p>Moral, productive:</p> <p>"Capitalism is a social system based on the recognition of individual rights, including property rights, in which all property is privately owned.</p> <p>"The recognition of individual rights entails the banishment of physical force from human relationships: basically, rights can be violated only by means of force. In a capitalist society, no man or group may initiate the use of physical force against others. The only function of the government, in such a society, is the task of protecting man's rights, i.e., the task of protecting him from physical force; the government acts as the agent of man's right of self-defense, and may use force only in retaliation and only against those who initiate its use; thus the government is the means of placing the retaliatory use of force under <i>objective control</i>." (<i>CUI</i>, "What Is Capitalism?" 19)</p> <p>Productiveness (<i>VoS</i>, "The Objectivist Ethics" 25)</p>
87. On liberalism	<p>No: "we are by no means 'liberal', we do not strive for 'progress', we do not need to stop up our ears against the</p>	<p>Yes.</p> <p>Though not 20th-century American so-called "liberals": "In the 1930's, the 'liberals' had a</p>

	<p>sirens of the marketplace who sing of the future — we are not in the least bit tempted by their songs of ‘equal rights’, ‘a free society’, ‘no more masters or servants’! (<i>JS</i> 377, Hill transl.)</p> <p>“Liberalism: in plain language, <i>reduction to the herd animal</i>.” (<i>TI</i> “Skirmishes” 38)</p> <p>“My ideas do not revolve around the degree of freedom that is granted to the one or to the other or to all, but around the degree of <i>power</i> that the one or the other should exercise over others or over all, and to what extent a sacrifice of freedom, even enslavement, provides the basis for the emergence of a <i>higher type</i>.” (<i>WP</i> 859)</p>	<p>program of broad social reforms and a crusading spirit, they advocated a planned society, they talked in terms of abstract principles, they propounded theories of a predominantly socialistic nature ...” (<i>CUI</i>, “The New Fascism: Rule by Consensus,” 209)</p>
88. On equality	False and destructive (<i>WP</i> 246)	Before the law (“The Age of Envy,” <i>NL</i> , 164)
89. On democracy	<p>Bad (<i>BGE</i> 202): “Democracy has ever been the form of decline in organizing power.” (<i>TI</i> Skirmishes 39). See (<i>HAH</i> 1.472).</p> <p>“[T]he <i>democratic</i> movement is the heir of the Christian movement.”; it will become a tool of “a master race, the future ‘masters of the earth’ ... philosophical men of power and artist-tyrants’ who will “employ democratic Europe as their most pliant and supple instrument for getting hold of the destinies of the earth” (Note for <i>BGE</i>, quoted in Hunt 39)</p>	Secondary to rights (“Collectivized Rights,” <i>VOS</i> , 140, pb 104)
90. On socialism	Bad. <i>Z</i> 1:11 ; <i>TI</i> “Skirmishes” 34; also 37: “Socialists are <i>décadents</i> ”.	Bad (“The Monument Builders,” <i>VOS</i> , 120, pb 91; 115, pb 87)
91. On the state: how it came to be and how it is justified	<p>“Whatever it says it lies.” [though for Nietzsche lying is not necessarily a bad thing]</p> <p>“State I call it ... where the slow suicide of all is called life”; “Where the state ends” we can then see “the bridges of the overman.” (<i>Z</i>, “On the New Idol”)</p> <p>“I used the word ‘state’: it is obvious who is meant by this—some pack of blond beasts of prey, a conqueror and master race which, organized for war and with the ability to organize, unhesitatingly lays its terrible claws</p>	<p>Good if stays within its proper limits.</p> <p>“Ours was the first government based on and strictly limited by a written document—the Constitution—which specifically forbids it to violate individual rights or to act on whim. The history of the atrocities perpetrated by all the other kinds of governments—unrestricted governments acting on unprovable assumptions—demonstrates the value and validity of the original political theory on which this country was built.” (<i>PWNI</i>, “Censorship: Local and Express,” 181)</p>

	upon a populace perhaps tremendously superior in numbers but still formless and nomad. That is after all how the 'state' began on earth: I think that sentimentalism which would have it begin with a 'contract' has been disposed of." (<i>GM</i> II:17)	
92. On the role of government	Limited (<i>D</i> 179) or none at all: "the state ... whatever it says it lies Everything about it is false" and "Only where the state ends, there begins the human being who is not superfluous" (<i>Z</i> I:11)	Limited ("The Nature of Government," <i>VOS</i> , 147, pb 109; 149, pb 110; <i>GS</i> , <i>FNI</i> , 231, pb 183)
93. On the welfare state	Bad. "State is the name of the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly it lies; and this lie slips from its mouth: 'I, the state, am the people.' It is a lie! It was creators who created peoples, and hung a faith and a love over them: thus they served life." (<i>Z</i> 1.11: "The New Idol")	Bad ("A Preview," <i>ARL</i> , I, 22, 2)
94. On aristocracy	Good (<i>BGE</i> 258); (in <i>TI</i> 56-57 is largely critical of the Manu caste order). "I am beginning to touch on what is serious for me, the 'European problem' as I understand it, the cultivation of a new caste that will rule Europe." (<i>BGE</i> 251) "Every enhancement of the type 'man' has so far been the work of an aristocratic society—and it will be so again and again—a society that believes in the long order of rank and differences in value between man and man, and that needs slavery in some sense or other." (<i>BGE</i> 257)	Bad: "Meritocracy" is an old anti-concept and one of the most contemptible package deals. By means of nothing more than its last five letters, that word obliterates the difference between mind and force: it equates the men of ability with <i>political</i> rulers, and the power of their creative achievements with <i>political</i> power. There is no difference, the word suggests, between freedom and tyranny: an "aristocracy" is tyranny by a politically established elite, a "democracy" is tyranny by the majority—and when a government protects individual rights, the result is tyranny by talent or "merit" (and since "to merit" means "to deserve," a free society is ruled by the tyranny of justice).' (<i>PWNI</i> , "An Untitled Letter," 105)
95. Slavery	Sometimes good (<i>BGE</i> 188); "Slavery is, as it seems, both in the cruder and in the more subtle sense, the indispensable means of spiritual discipline and cultivation, too." (<i>BGE</i> 190); A healthy aristocracy "accepts with a good conscience the sacrifice of untold human beings, who, <i>for its sake</i> , must be reduced and lowered to incomplete human beings, to slaves, to instruments" (<i>BGE</i> 258); N seeks "a noble mode of thought ... that believes	Evil. "Capitalism cannot work with slave labor. It was the agrarian, feudal South that maintained slavery. It was the industrial, capitalistic North that wiped it out—as capitalism wiped out slavery and serfdom in the whole civilized world of the nineteenth century. "What greater virtue can one ascribe to a social system than the fact that it leaves no possibility for any man to serve his own interests by enslaving other men? What nobler system could be desired by anyone whose goal

	<p>in slavery and in many degrees of subjection as the presupposition of every higher culture” (<i>WP</i> 464);</p> <p>Nietzsche wonders “to what extent a sacrifice of freedom, even enslavement itself, gives the basis for the bringing-forth of a <i>higher type</i>.” (<i>WP</i> 859)</p>	<p>is man’s well-being?” (<i>CUI</i>, “Theory and Practice,” 136)</p>
96. Healthy state	<p>“Strong ages, <i>noble</i> cultures, see in pity, in ‘love of one’s neighbor’, in a lack of self and self-reliance, something contemptible.” (<i>TI</i> Skirmishes 37)</p> <p>“For institutions to exist there must exist the kind of will, instinct, imperative which is anti-liberal to the point of malice” (<i>TI</i> Skirmishes 39)</p>	<p>Limited, while efficient in the performance of those limited functions.</p>
97. War as good	<p>Yes: “Preparatory human beings.—I welcome all signs that a more virile, warlike age is about to begin, which will restore honor to courage above all. For this age shall prepare the way for one yet higher, and it shall gather the strength that this higher age will require one day—the age that will carry heroism into the search for knowledge and that will wage wars for the sake of ideas and their consequences.” (<i>JS</i> 283)</p> <p>“War essential. It is vain rhapsodizing and sentimentality to continue to expect much (even more, to expect a very great deal) from mankind, once it has learned not to wage war. For the time being, we know of no other means to imbue exhausted peoples, as strongly and surely as every great war does, with that raw energy of the battleground, that deep impersonal hatred, that murderous coldbloodedness with a good conscience, that communal, organized ardor in destroying the enemy, that proud indifference to great losses, to one’s own existence and to that of one’s friends. That muted, earthquakelike convulsion of the soul.” (<i>HA</i> 477)</p> <p>“One must learn from war: ... (2) one must learn to sacrifice many and to take one’s cause seriously enough not to spare men” (<i>WP</i> 982)</p>	<p>No: “Wars are the second greatest evil that human societies can perpetrate. (The first is dictatorship, the enslavement of their own citizens, which is the cause of wars.)” (<i>CUI</i>, “The Wreckage of the Consensus,” 224).</p> <p>“The trader and the warrior have been fundamental antagonists throughout history. Trade does not flourish on battlefields, factories do not produce under bombardments, profits do not grow on rubble. Capitalism is a society of <i>traders</i>—for which it has been denounced by every would-be gunman who regards trade as ‘selfish’ and conquest as ‘noble.’</p> <p>Let those who are actually concerned with peace observe that <i>capitalism gave mankind the longest period of peace in history</i>—a period during which there were no wars involving the entire civilized world—from the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815 to the outbreak of World War I in 1914.” (<i>CUI</i>, “The Roots of War,” 38)</p>

	<p>“Culture absolutely cannot do without passions, vices, and acts of malice.”</p> <p>“Religious war has signified the greatest progress of the masses hitherto; for it proves that the mass has begun to treat concepts with respect.” (<i>JS</i> 144)</p> <p>Also: (<i>TI</i> Skirmishes 38 on “war is a training in freedom”)</p> <p>“Our liberal representatives, as is well known, lack the time for reflecting on the nature of man: else they would know that they work in vain when they work for a ‘gradual decrease of the military burden.’ Rather, only when this kind of need has become greatest will the kind of god be nearest who alone can help. The tree of war-glory can only be destroyed all at once, by a stroke of lightning: but lightning, as indeed you know, comes from a cloud—and from up high.” (<i>WS</i> 284)</p>	
98. Civilization as ascending or declining	<p>Declining (<i>BGE</i> 202; <i>GM</i> I:11,12); but Z must come (<i>GM</i> II:24)</p> <p>“One hardly dares speak anymore of the will to power: it was different in Athens.’ (Notes 1880-81, x, 414)</p>	Currently declining; future could go either way
99. Freedom	<p>“And war is a training in freedom. Or what is freedom? That one has the will to self-responsibility. That one preserves the distance which divides us. That one has become more indifferent to hardship, toil, privation, even to life. That one is ready to sacrifice men to one’s cause, oneself not excepted. Freedom means that the manly instincts that delight in war and victory have gained mastery over the other instincts—for example, the instinct for ‘happiness’. The man <i>who has become free</i>—and how much more the <i>mind</i> that has become free—spurns the contemptible sort of well-being dreamed of by shopkeepers, Christians, cows, women, Englishmen and other democrats. The free man is a <i>warrior</i>.” (<i>TI</i> Skirmishes 38; connect to Hegel on the fraud of English freedom)</p>	<p>The social fundamental.</p> <p>“What is the basic, the essential, the crucial principle that differentiates freedom from slavery? It is the principle of voluntary action versus physical coercion or compulsion.” (<i>CUI</i>, “America’s Persecuted Minority: Big Business,” 46)</p>

100. Power	<p>“the most beautiful still appears only in the dark, and sinks, scarcely born, into eternal night—I mean the spectacle of that strength which employs genius <i>not for works</i> but for <i>itself as a work</i>; that is, for its own constraint, for the purification of its imagination, for the imposition of order and choice upon the influx of tasks and impressions. The great human being is still, in precisely the greatest thing that demands reverence, invisible like a too distant star: his <i>victory over strength</i> remains without eyes to see it and consequently without song and singer.” (<i>D</i> 548)</p> <p>“He cannot control himself, and from that a poor woman infers that it will be easy to control him and casts her net for him. Soon she will be his slave.” (<i>JS</i> 227)</p>	Pluralistic
101. Sex and marriage	<p>State-run (<i>BGE</i> 251); see <i>D</i> 42.</p> <p>“society, the great trustee of life, is responsible to life itself for every miscarried life—it also has to pay for such lives: consequently, it ought to prevent them. In numerous cases, society ought to prevent procreation: to this end, it may hold in readiness, without regard to descent, rank, or spirit, the most rigorous means of constraint, deprivation of freedom, in certain circumstances castration.” (<i>WtP</i>)</p>	Romantic passion and individual choice
102. Cosmopolitanism and internationalism	<p>Yes: “the strongest possible European mixed race.” “One should not be afraid to proclaim oneself simply a good European and actively work for the amalgamation of nations.” The means by which this is to be accomplished? “Trade and industry, the post and the book-trade, the possession in common of all higher culture, rapid changing of home and scene, the nomadic life now lived by all who do not own land” and their consequence, “a weakening and finally abolition of nations.” (<i>Human</i> I: 475)</p>	Cosmopolitanism yes. Functional nationalism as safety net.
103. Racism	No	No: “Racism is the lowest, most crudely primitive form of collectivism.”

		<p>“Racism is a doctrine of, by and for brutes.”</p> <p>“Like every form of determinism, racism invalidates the specific attribute which distinguishes man from all other living species: his rational faculty. Racism negates two aspects of man’s life: reason and choice, or mind and morality, replacing them with chemical predestination.” (VOS, “Racism” 126)</p>
104. Women	<p>“Women are considered profound. Why? Because one never fathoms their depths. Women aren’t even shallow.” (TI Maxims and Arrows 27)</p>	<p>Ethical and political equality.</p> <p>Equal existential and psychological competence.</p> <p>Some sexual-psychological differences between men and women. E.g.: “For a woman <i>qua</i> woman, the essence of femininity is hero-worship—the desire to look up to man. “To look up” does not mean dependence, obedience or anything implying inferiority. It means an intense kind of admiration; and admiration is an emotion that can be experienced only by a person of strong character and independent value-judgments. A ‘clinging vine’ type of woman is not an admirer, but an exploiter of men. Hero-worship is a demanding virtue: a woman has to be worthy of it and of the hero she worships. Intellectually and morally, i.e., as a human being, she has to be his equal; then the object of her worship is specifically his <i>masculinity</i>, not any human virtue she might lack.” (“About a Woman President,” TO December 1968)</p>
Art and Sense of Life		
105. Exalted sense of human potential	<p>Yes: “one emerges again and again into the light, one experiences again and again one’s golden hour of victory—and then one stands forth as one was born, unbreakable, tensed, ready for new, even harder, remoter things, like a bow that distress serves to draw tauter.” (GM I:12)</p> <p>“Yet persistently a few men awaken—men who look back at greatness, are encouraged by reflecting on it, and feel themselves blessed, as though human life were a splendid thing, as though the loveliest fruit of this bitter plant were the knowledge that before them one man lived his life with pride and strength, another profoundly, and a</p>	<p>Yes (VOS, 14, pb 22; “Introduction to <i>The Fountainhead</i>,” TO, March 1968, 4)</p>

	third with compassion and benevolence—but all bequeathed the same lesson: the man who is ready to risk his existence lives most beautifully.”	
106. Life as a cosmic battle	Yes	Yes
107. Struggle as good	Yes (<i>BGE</i> 262)	Yes (<i>RM</i> , “Art and Sense of Life,” 48)
108. Suffering as essential to creativity and development	<p>Yes. “The discipline of suffering, of great suffering—do you not know that only this discipline has created all enhancements of man so far? That tension of the soul in unhappiness which cultivates its strength, its shudders face to face with great ruin, its inventiveness and courage in enduring, persevering, interpreting, and exploiting suffering, and whatever has been granted to it of profundity, secret, mask, spirit, cunning, greatness—was it not granted to it through suffering, through the discipline of great suffering? (<i>BGE</i> 225; also <i>BGE</i> 270)</p> <p>“Only great pain is the ultimate liberator of the spirit I doubt that such pain makes us ‘better’; but I know that it makes us more profound” (<i>JS</i> Pref:3).</p> <p>To his kind of men: “I wish [them] suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities—I wish that they should not remain unfamiliar with profound self-contempt, the torture of self-mistrust, the wretchedness of the vanquished” (<i>WP</i> 910)</p> <p>Though out of this will/can come joy, gaiety, and being a free spirit.</p>	Philosophically: No. Literarily: Yes.
109. Benevolent universe	<p>No: “For a philosopher to say, ‘the good and the beautiful are one,’ is infamy; if he goes on to add, ‘also the true,’ one ought to thrash him. Truth is ugly.” (Notebook of 1888)</p> <p>“Conscious of the truth he has once seen, man now sees everywhere only the horror or absurdity of existence. He is nauseated.” (<i>BT</i> 7)</p>	<p>Yes: “There is a fundamental conviction which some people never acquire, some hold only in their youth, and a few hold to the end of their days—the conviction that <i>ideas matter</i> That ideas matter means that knowledge matters, that truth matters, that one’s mind matters ...</p> <p>“Its consequence is the inability to believe in the power or the triumph of evil. No matter what corruption one observes in one’s immediate background, one is unable to accept it as normal, permanent or <i>metaphysically</i> right.</p>

		One feels: "This injustice (or terror or falsehood or frustration or pain or agony) is the exception in life, not the rule." One feels certain that somewhere on earth—even if not anywhere in one's surroundings or within one's reach—a proper, human way of life is possible to human beings, and justice matters." (NL, "The Inexplicable Personal Alchemy," 118)
110. Love your life no matter what	Yes, though a <i>tragic</i> sense of life, not pessimistic. " <i>Amor fati</i> : Let that be my love henceforth!" (JS 276) Also: JS 48; BGE 56	Yes: create your fate.
111. Art as metaphysical	Yes. "Art is not an imitation of nature but its metaphysical supplement, raised up beside it in order to overcome it." (BT 24)	Yes: "Art is a selective re-creation of reality according to an artist's metaphysical value-judgments. Man's profound need of art lies in the fact that his cognitive faculty is conceptual, i.e., that he acquires knowledge by means of abstractions, and needs the power to bring his widest metaphysical abstractions into his immediate, perceptual awareness. Art fulfills this need: by means of a selective re-creation, it concretizes man's fundamental view of himself and of existence." (RM, "Art and Cognition," 45)
112. Tragedy as highest	Yes: "For what purpose humanity is there should not even concern us: why you are there, that you should ask yourself: and if you have no ready answer, then set for yourself goals, high and noble goals, and perish in pursuit of them! I know of no better life purpose than to perish in attempting the great and the impossible ..." (Note from 1873)	No: "We do not think that tragedy is our natural state. We do not live in chronic dread of disaster. We do not expect disaster until we have specific reason to expect it, and when we encounter it, we are free to fight it. It is not happiness, but suffering, that we consider unnatural. It is not success but calamity that we regard as the abnormal exception in human life." (AS, Dagny Taggart speaking to Ragnar Danneskjöld)
113. Romanticism as highest	No: Contra Alexandrian man (BT)	Yes (RM). Contra Naturalism: ("What is Romanticism," RM, 81, pb 99; 83, pb 101; 102, pb 115; 104, pb 117; "The Esthetic Vacuum of our Age," RM, 114, pb 124; 116, pb 125; "The goal of my writing," RM, 163, pb 164; "The Basic Principles of Literature," RM, 60; pb 83; 61, pb 83)
114. Creating as egoistic/individualistic	No: "to us the subjective artist is simply the bad artist, and since we demand above all, in every genre and range of art, a triumph over subjectivity,	Yes (RM)

	<p>deliverance from the self, the silencing of every personal will and desire.”</p> <p>“the subject—the striving individual bent on furthering his egoistic purposes—can be thought of only as the enemy of art, never its source. (BT 5)</p>	<p>“Throughout the centuries there were men who took first steps down new roads armed with nothing but their own vision.” (F, Part 4)</p>
115. Art and truth	<p>“Art is <i>more valuable</i> than truth” (WP 853).</p> <p>“<i>What one should learn from artists.</i>—How can we make things beautiful, attractive, and desirable for us when they are not? And I rather think that in themselves they never are.” (JS 299)</p>	<p>Art as concretization of abstractions. (RM, “Art and Cognition”)</p>
116. Creativity	<p>“We ... want to become those we are—human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves.” (JS 335).</p> <p>“To become what one is, one must not have the faintest notion <i>what</i> one is.” (EH ‘Why I am so Clever’ 9; echoes of Kant on genius in CJ and Hegel on the Absolute’s coming to self-awareness.)</p> <p>“Every artist knows how far from any feeling of letting himself go his ‘most natural state’ is—the free ordering, placing, disposing, giving form in the moment of ‘inspiration’—and how strictly and subtly he obeys thousandfold laws precisely then, laws that precisely on account of their hardness and determination defy all formulation through concepts.” (BGE 188)</p>	<p>Learned. Integration of conscious and subconscious processes.</p>
117. Art as palliative or inspirational	<p>Palliative: “As an aesthetic phenomenon existence is still bearable for us” (JS 107)</p> <p>“Only as an esthetic product can the world be justified to all eternity—although our consciousness of our own significance does scarcely exceed the consciousness a painted soldier might have of the battle in which he takes part.” (BT 5)</p>	<p>Inspirational fuel: “Romantic art is the fuel and the spark plug of a man’s soul; its task is to set a soul on fire and never let it go out.” (RM, “Art and Moral Treason,” 152)</p>
118. Selectivity as a value-judgment	<p>“An artist chooses his subjects; that is his way of praising.” (JS 245)</p>	<p>Yes.</p>

119. Romanticism	“that barbaric though enchanting outpouring from an undisciplined and chaotic soul of hot and highly colored things, which is what we understood by art when we were young.” (<i>HAH</i> 173)	Yes. “Philosophically, Romanticism is a crusade to glorify man’s existence; psychologically, it is experienced simply as the desire to make life interesting.” (<i>RM</i> , “What Is Romanticism?”, 109)
120. Suffering	“The discipline of suffering, of <i>great</i> suffering—do you not know that only <i>this</i> discipline has created all enhancements of man so far? That tension of the soul in unhappiness which cultivates its strength, its shudders face to face with great ruin, its inventiveness and courage in enduring, persevering, interpreting, and exploiting suffering, and whatever has been granted to it of profundity, secret, mask, spirit, cunning, greatness—was it not granted to it through suffering, through the discipline of great suffering?” (<i>BGE</i> 225)	As result of accidents of mistakes; not fundamental
121. Beauty	“The noblest kind of beauty is not that which suddenly transports us, which makes a violent and intoxicating assault upon us (such beauty can easily excite disgust), but that which slowly infiltrates us, which we bear away with us almost without noticing and encounter again in dreams, but which finally, after having for long lain modestly in our heart, takes total possession of us, filling our eyes with tears and our heart with longing.” (<i>HAH</i> , 149)	
Cultural Analysis		
122. Cultural disaster looming	Yes: The West moves to “catastrophe, with a tortured tension that is growing from decade to decade.” (<i>WP</i> , Preface; 2) “What else, in the desolate waste of present-day culture, holds any promise of a sound, healthy future? In vain we look for a single powerfully branching root, a spot of earth that is fruitful: we see only dust, sand, dullness, and languor.” (<i>BT</i> 20)	Yes: “we are a mixed economy, i.e., a mixture of capitalism and statism, of freedom and controls. A mixed economy is a country in the process of disintegration, a civil war of pressure groups looting and devouring each other.” (“Check Your Premises” “The Obliteration of Capitalism,” <i>TON</i> 4:10, October 1965, p. 47)
123. Sense of isolation from	Yes: “homeless in a distinctive and honorable sense” (<i>JS</i> 377)	Yes and no

surrounding culture		
124. The future as winnable	Yes, for some: “the first of a new nobility ... [and] a happiness ... humanity has not known so far.” (<i>JS</i> 337)	Yes. “Anyone who fights for the future, lives in it today.” (<i>RM</i>)
<i>On Others</i>		
125. On Christianity	<p>“A rebellion of everything that crawls on the ground against that which has height.” (<i>A</i> 43)</p> <p>“The Christian idea of God”: “is one of the most corrupt conceptions of God the world has ever seen God having degenerated into a <i>contradiction of life</i> instead of its transfiguration and eternal <i>yes</i>! God as declared aversion to life, to nature, to the will to life! God as every slander against the ‘here and now’” (<i>A</i> 18).</p> <p>“It was Christianity with its <i>ressentiment</i> against life that first made sexuality into something unclean, it threw filth on the origin, the presupposition of our life.” (<i>TI</i> “Ancients” 4)</p>	Ditto (“ <i>Playboy’s</i> Interview with Ayn Rand,” pamphlet, 10)
126. On Plato	“Plato is coward before reality.” (<i>TI</i> What I Owe to the Ancients 2)	Ditto (<i>IOE</i> , 2)
127. On Kant	<p>“A catastrophic spider” (<i>A</i> 11); “that most deformed concept-cripple of all time” (<i>TI</i>, “What the Germans Lack” 7); Kant’s “abhorrent scholasticism” (<i>TI</i> Skirmishes 49)</p> <p>“<i>Kant’s joke</i>.—Kant wanted to prove, in a way that would dumfound the common man, that the common man was right: that was the secret joke of this soul. He wrote against the scholars in support of popular prejudice, but for scholars and not for the people.” (<i>JS</i> 193)</p>	Kant’s philosophy is a “monstrous spider hanging in midair” (<i>FNI</i> 34) “Causality Versus Duty,” <i>PWNI</i> , 117, pb 97; “Brief Summary,” <i>TO</i> , Sept., 1971, 4)
128. On the Jews	“a people firmly attached to life...” (<i>D</i> 72)	
<i>Method and Style</i>		

<p>129. Rhetorical clarity</p>	<p>Esotericism: “It is not by any means necessarily an objection to a book when anyone finds it impossible to understand: perhaps that was part of the author's intention—he did not want to be understood by just ‘anybody.’ All the nobler spirits and tastes select their audience when they wish to communicate; and choosing that, one at the same time erects barriers against ‘the others.’ All the more subtle laws of any style have their origin at this point: they at the same time keep away, create a distance, forbid ‘entrance,’ understanding, as said above — while they open the ears of those whose ears are related to ours.” (<i>JS</i> 381)</p> <p>“<i>Being profound and seeming profound.</i>—Those who know that they are profound strive for clarity. Those who would like to seem profound to the crowd strive for obscurity. For the crowd believes that if it cannot see to the bottom of something it must be profound. It is so timid and dislikes going into the water” (<i>JS</i> 173)</p> <p>“Our highest insights must—and should—sound like follies and sometimes like crimes when they are heard without permission by those who are not predisposed and predestined for them” (<i>BGE</i> 30).</p>	<p>Accessible and straightforward to all active-minded and intelligent.</p>
<p>130. Systematicity</p>	<p>“Beware of systematizers!—There is a play-acting of systematizers: ... they will to impersonate complete and uniformly strong natures.” (<i>D</i> 318)</p> <p>Contrast <i>GM</i> Preface:2</p>	<p>Yes.</p>
<p>131. Style</p>	<p>“I fancy that with this Zarathustra I have brought the German language to its full realization. After <i>Luther</i> and Goethe a third step had to be taken—tell me, my old friend, whether there has ever been such a combination of strength, resilience and euphony. Read Goethe after a page of my book ... my line is tougher, more virile, without ever lapsing into coarseness, like Luther’s. My style is <i>dance</i>, playing with symmetries of every kind, jumping over</p>	<p>Romantic, cinematic</p>

	them and mocking them. This enters the very vowels.” (Feb 22, 1884 letter to Rohde; q Hayman 272)	
132. Philosophy and Fiction	Zarathustra	Atlas
133. Absorbing and transcending literary traditions	Biblical language	“Odysseus, Jesus, and Dagny” themes
Miscellany		
134. Symbolisms	Apollo and Dionysus	End of <i>AS</i> : Galt’s tracing the dollar sign; Wyatt’s Torch in the distance
135. Existing and thinking	“ <i>Sum, ergo cogito: cogito, ergo sum.</i> ” (<i>JS</i> 276)	“reversing a costly historical error”: “I am, therefore I’ll think.” (<i>AS</i>)
136. Architecture	<i>JS</i> 291 on Genoa’s architecture	Opening paragraphs of <i>F</i> .
137. Reception by contemporary philosophers	“For a time, Nietzsche, then professor of classical philology at the University of Basle, had no students in his field. His lectures were sabotaged by German philosophy professors who advised their students not to show up for Nietzsche’s courses.” (M. Cowen 1962, “Introduction” to Nietzsche’s <i>Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks</i> , 4)	Professor Allan Bloom: “When I first noticed the decline in reading during the late sixties, I began asking my large introductory classes ... what books really count for them. There is always a girl who mentions Ayn Rand’s <i>The Fountainhead</i> , a book, though hardly literature, which, with its sub-Nietzschean assertiveness, excites somewhat eccentric youngsters to a new way of life.” (Allan Bloom, <i>The Closing of the American Mind</i>)
138. Early and late periods	Schopenhauer and Kant. Early more idealist metaphysical; later more positivist. “Thinking out the principle problems ... always brings me back ... to the same conclusions :they are already there, as veiled and obscure as possible in my <i>Geburt der Tragödie</i> , and everything I have since learned has become and ingrown part of them.” (Letter to Franz Overbeck, 2 July 1885; q Hayman 286)	Aristotle, Nietzsche, and the Romantics
139. Titles of works	N’s subtitles in <i>EH</i> : Some have suggested megalomania or madness. Or ironic honesty: countering Socrates’s modesty about not being wise, and countering Jesus’s admonition to humility. Also countering false modesty of most autobiographies: most such	<i>Selfishness</i> . Heinz Pagels’s remark: “No great science was done in the spirit of humility.” <i>Manifesto. Fountainhead. Living. Shrugged. Ideal.</i>

	<p>pretend not be telling us how wise and clever they are.</p> <p>Plus good marketing: arresting.</p> <p>Plus truth: Nietzsche <i>was</i> clever and dynamite.</p>	
Issue	Nietzsche's position	Rand's position