IS IT REASONABLE in today’s world to believe that God exists? My answer is yes, and the thesis I wish to defend is that it is rational to believe that God exists. I do not mean that God’s existence can be proved with mathematical certainty, but I do want to argue that there are good reasons for believing in God, and the believer is well within her epistemic rights in believing that God exists.

There are a number of arguments I could offer on behalf of my thesis. Take, for example, the argument for God based on the design in the universe. In spite of David Hume, this argument has received strong support in recent years from astronomy, physics, and biology. Scientists are discovering that the universe is a finely-tuned and delicately-balanced harmony of fundamental constants, or cosmic singularities. These constants are the numerical values assigned to the various facets of the universe, such as the rate of expansion of the Big Bang, the value of the weak and strong nuclear forces, and a host of other constants of nature.

For example, in the formation of the universe, the balance of matter to antimatter had to be accurate to one part in ten billion for the universe to even arise. Had it been larger or greater by one part in ten billion, no universe would have arisen. There would also have been no universe capable of sustaining life if the expansion rate of the Big Bang had been one billionth of a percent larger or smaller.

Furthermore, the chance possibilities of life arising spontaneously through mere chance has been calculated by Cambridge astronomer Fred Hoyle as being $1 \times 10^{40}$, which Hoyle likens to the probabilities of a tornado blowing through a junkyard and forming a Boeing 747. Had these values, these cosmic constants which are independent of one another, been infinitesimally greater or smaller than what they are, no life remotely similar to ours—indeed, no life at all would have been possible. The more we discover, the more it appears, as one scientist put it, “The universe seems to have evolved with life in mind.”

The harmony of these features cannot be explained by mere chance. Says Paul Davies, theoretical physicist at Cambridge: “It is hard to resist the impression that the present structure of the universe, apparently so sensitive to minor alterations in the numbers, has been rather carefully thought out ... the seemingly miraculous concurrence of these numerical values must remain the most compelling evidence for cosmic design.”

In biology, scientists have discovered that DNA molecules do not merely contain redundant order, but they contain what they call information. They say that DNA can be transcribed into RNA, and RNA can be translated into protein. Now Carl Sagan, and this is one of the few times I agree with him, has made certain claims about the search for extraterrestrial intelligence, called SETI. According to Sagan, in that search all we need to do is find one message with information in it from outer space, and we will be able to recognize the presence of intelligence. We don’t even need to be able to translate it; it is the presence of information instead of order that will tip us off to the presence of intelligence.

Well, what is sauce for the artificial goose ought to be sauce for the DNA gander, and I argue that the information in DNA molecules is evidence of intelligence behind it.
Or consider the arguments for God from the existence of moral value and meaning in life. If God does not exist, it is hard to see how there could be any such thing as prescriptive, non-natural morality. It just doesn’t seem that the Big Bang could spit out moral values, at least not at the rate it spit out hydrogen atoms.

As one philosopher put it: “In a world without God, mankind could not be more significant than a swarm of mosquitoes or a barnyard of pigs, for the same cosmic process that coughed them both up in the first place will eventually swallow them all up again.” Even the late J. L. Mackie, perhaps the greatest atheist of our century, said, “Moral properties constitute so odd a cluster of qualities and relations that they are most unlikely to have arisen in the ordinary course of events without an all-powerful god to create them.”

A typical atheist response to all of this is to say there are no irreducible moral truths in the world or irreducible moral properties. What one must do is to “create” values or decide to adopt the moral point of view. But it doesn’t seem to me that the choice between Mother Teresa and Hitler can be likened, say, to the choice as to whether I am going to be a baseball player or a tuba player. Such a choice is not a rational one, and according to this response to the theistic argument, neither is the choice of adopting a moral point of view.

Mention could also be made of the arguments from the exciting archaeological confirmations of much of the Bible, the puzzling question of how mind or consciousness could have arisen in a world of only matter, and even if it did, how it could be trusted to give us truth about the world; and the fact that millions of people claim to have direct experiences of a benevolent Creator ...

Consider the first premise: *God created the universe from nothing a finite time ago.* This belief is rational in light of the philosophical and scientific support for it.

First the philosophical argument. It is impossible to traverse or cross an actual infinite number of events by successive addition. An actual infinite, what mathematicians call *aleph null*, $\aleph_0$, is a set of distinct things whose number is actually infinite. Infinity, plus or minus any number including infinity, is still infinity. This contrasts with a potential infinite which can increase forever without limit but is always finite.

By contrast, an actual infinite has no room for growth and is nonfinite; that is, one of its subsets can be put into one-to-one correspondence with the set itself. The impossibility of crossing an actual infinite has sometimes been put by saying that one cannot count to infinity no matter how long he counts. For he will always be at some specific number which could be increased by one to generate another specific number; and that is true even if one counted forever.

Now if one cannot cross an actual infinite, then the past must have been finite. If it were infinite, then to come to the present moment, one would have had to have traversed an actual infinite to get here, which is impossible. Without a first event, there could be no second, third, or any specifiable number of events including the present one. To get to the present moment by crossing an actual infinite would be like trying to jump out of a bottomless pit. Not only could one never complete the jump, one could never even get started; for to reach any point in the series, one must already have crossed an infinite number of points to get to that point, as Zeno’s puzzles clearly showed.
Put differently, suppose you go back through the events of the past in your mind. You will either come to a beginning, or you will not. If you come to a beginning, then the past is finite and my argument is settled. That would be the first event. If you had never come to a beginning, then the past is actually infinite—and as you go back in your mind, you never in principle could exhaust the events of the past. It would be impossible to traverse the past going backward in your mind.

Since time doesn’t go backward but forward, and the number of events traversed is not a function of the direction of movement, this amounts to saying that the present could never be realized. But since it has been realized-after all, here we are—there must have been a first event, and this event must have been spontaneously generated by a situation that was immutable, unchanging, timeless, and free.

Now most of the experiences we have in life where an event is spontaneously generated without sufficient conditions prior to it occur by means of *agent causation*, or what we would call agent causes. That is, you and I act every day; we raise our arms; we do things. It seems reasonable, based upon agent causation, therefore, to say that the first event was spontaneously caused to be by a personal agent of some kind. The major alternative is that the first event popped into existence out of nothing without a cause, and that doesn’t seem reasonable to me.

That there was a beginning to the universe is confirmed by two areas of science as well as philosophy. The first is the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which states that in a closed system the amount of energy available to do work is always decreasing. It can also be put by saying that the amount of disorganization, or randomness, increases toward a maximum. Applied to the universe as a whole, the Second Law states that every day the universe becomes more and more disorganized. In other words, it is burning up. It will eventually die a cold death. The main implication of this is, as one physicist put it, “the universe cannot have existed forever. Otherwise it would have already reached its equilibrium end state an infinite time ago.” Conclusion: The universe did not always exist.” Scientist Richard Slagel says, “In some way the universe must have been wound up.”

The Big Bang provides another argument. In 1929 Edwin Hubble discovered a phenomenon known as the red shift, which implies that space is expanding outward and that all bodies in space are growing apart.

These and other observations have led to the Big Bang theory, which has two key features. First, around 15 billion years ago, according to the theory, everything—space, time, energy was all compacted into a mathematical point with no dimensions, and this exploded to form the present universe. In the words of Cambridge astronomer Fred Hoyle, “The universe was shrunk down to nothing.” So the Big Bang implies the universe sprang into existence from a state of affairs that has been described by some as nothingness.

Second, because of the density of the universe, there was only one initial creation, and there will be no contraction or further explosion in the future. There was only one initial creation, or first event. What is the atheist to do here? Oxford’s Anthony Kenny has the answer. He says, “A proponent of the Big Bang theory, at least if he is an atheist, must believe that the matter of the universe came from nothing and by nothing.”

I would like to conclude by noting an observation by Robert Jastrow, director of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies. Jastrow says, “For the scientist who has lived by his faith in the power of reason, the story ends like a bad dream. He has
scaled the mountains of ignorance—he is about to conquer the highest peak; as he
pulls himself over the final rock, he is greeted by a band of theologians who have
been sitting there for centuries.”

Philosophically and scientifically, the belief that God created the universe a
finite time ago is eminently reasonable . . .

In summary, I have argued there are good reasons to believe that a personal
God created the world a finite time ago. In addition to the arguments I cited at the
beginning, I appealed to the philosophical argument against the possibility of
traversing an actual infinite and the scientific arguments employing the Second Law
of Thermodynamics and the uniqueness of the Big Bang, which make this
proposition reasonable.

For these and other reasons one is well within his or her epistemic rights in
believing that the Christian God exists.

* * *

Kai Nielson, No, There Is No God

I AM GOING TO ARGUE quite to the contrary to what Professor Moreland has
been saying, and this is what will seem offensive to many of you, but I certainly don’t
intend it to be offensive. I am going to argue that for somebody living in the
twentieth century with a good philosophical and a good scientific education, who
thinks carefully about the matter, that for such a person it is irrational to believe in
God.

Now I don’t mean by that that I think I’m more rational than Professor Moreland
or the rest of you. Rational people in my view can have irrational beliefs. I’m sure I
have some. If I can spot them or they are pointed out to me, I’ll reject them. I also
mean this in a doubly hypothetical way. By that I mean that if my arguments are
right—that is the first hypothetical—and if people do have a good scientific and
philosophical education—you can have one without the other—that then they should
come to see that it is irrational to believe in God. What I will do is provide an
argument for that in just a moment.

All right. Is the Christian view of our world the true one? The Christian, of course,
sees the world in the same way as others, but sees more besides. Part of this “more
besides,” but not all of it, of course, is that God exists. Does He?

That question, I first want to contend, is not as straightforward as it may seem. The
standard view—I mean the standard view at present, among at least philosophers
and a large number of theologians, though it is not a view that either Professor
Moreland or I myself accept, but it is a very standard view—is that you can’t prove
that God does exist and you can’t prove that He doesn’t exist. Indeed, some will say
you can’t even successfully argue that it is more probable that He does exist or more
probable that God doesn’t exist. In debates concerning religion neither side has been
able to win the day here.

This being so, the argument goes—this is, let me repeat, the standard view—the
believer is not being unreasonable in continuing to believe, and the atheist is not
being unreasonable in not believing in God. Reason, a thoughtful attention to our
experience or the reflective use of our intelligence, will not settle matters here.
Whether we believe or not, so the standard view has had it, is a straight matter of faith. There is no showing that belief or unbelief is the more reasonable, though it can be shown that both atheism and theism are reasonable views. What you can’t do is show that one is more reasonable than the other. That is, by now, a very standard view. Philosophical theologians like John Hick or Terence Penelhum believe this—and indeed have given distinguished articulations of such views.

Now the first thing I want to note is that this is a far cry from the grand tradition of natural theology. In the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus and William of Occam thought they could prove that God exists and that it is irrational to be an atheist or an agnostic. Now, that’s a great distance from the standard view. The standard view is a rather modern invention. A Moslem philosopher that I know regards it as a kind of a revisionism of Christianity, or, for that matter, of Islam where it is so influenced. And I take it that Professor Moreland, though he waffled a bit about this, doesn’t have that standard view. He thinks that it is more probable that God exists than He does not, and in that sense you can give some kind of a proof of the existence of God. That is brave of him indeed because there are very very few Christians, at least Christians who are philosophers, people of Thomist persuasions apart, who think you can do that. In my discussion later, I will come to some of his arguments for this.

I reject the standard view as well. I think, as I said to you initially, that belief in God is irrational. That is, it is irrational for someone who has a good scientific and philosophic education. And I point out to you that I don’t mean to say by this that I think that I’m more rational than Professor Hick or some religious person, because I remind you that rational people can have irrational beliefs. And what I’m maintaining is that belief in God for people in the twentieth century, not people at all times and at all places, with a good scientific and philosophic education, is irrational.

Now why do I say that? Why, in my view, is belief in God irrational? Take a belief in a Zeus-like, anthropomorphic God. Such a belief is just plainly false and superstitious. Such a being is an odd kind of being, and there is no evidence for His reality. Moreover, anything that could be observed, as an anthropomorphic God could or in any way directly be detected, would not be the God of Christianity or at least of advanced Judeo-Christianity. As I think it was Kierkegaard who quipped, “God is not a great green parrot you can possibly see.” But the anthropomorphic God, and anthropomorphic conception of God, is not incoherent; it’s just superstitious to believe in such a god. But at least since the Middle Ages, and even earlier than that, religious people have long since, at least when they are reflecting about the nature of God, ceased believing in an anthropomorphic Zeus-like God, while continuing to believe in the God of developed Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. And it is this belief, a much far more ethereal conception of God, that I maintain is incoherent.

There are a number of arguments for that. But I am going to stick with just one, developing it in some detail. This is a dangerous strategy because it puts all your eggs in one basket, but it will allow me to develop one argument I take to be of vital importance. I’m going to use the opposite argumentative strategy from Professor Moreland. Professor Moreland gave you a battery of arguments. I’m going to give you one sustained argument principally. And if I have enough time, I’ll give you some supplementary ones which will argue to the same conclusion.

Consider the problem about the reference of the word “God” or any alternative word in some other language with the same meaning. What does the word “God” refer to for Christians or for Jews?
Consider the sentence, God made the heavens and the earth,” as distinct from “Louis made pasta and cake.” Consider those two sentences. What is “God” in this first sentence supposed to stand for, and how is the referent of that term to be identified? Compare this with “Louis.” I can say “Somebody asked, Who’s Louis?” and I’ll say, “That chap over there.” That’s what philosophers would call an *ostensive definition*, an extralinguistic definition. I point out the reference of the term “Louis” by pointing to its referent. There is another way to give meaning to the term. I could say “Well, the professor, one of the professors of philosophy at the University of Mississippi,” or “the professor of philosophy at the University of Mississippi who studied Kierkegaard in Denmark,” or “the man sitting on the platform with the dark glasses on.” I could give you a number of intra-linguistic definitions, what philosophers call “definite descriptions,” which identify who Louis is. So when I say, “Louis made pasta and cake,” you can understand what would make that sentence true or false.

Now go back to the religious sentence, “God made the heavens and the earth.” How do we know, as we said when we rejected the anthropomorphic conception, that anything that could be pointed to or literally seen or literally observed or literally experienced or literally noted wouldn’t be God? It would be some kind of temporal something that you could detect; something limited. So God, unlike Louis [Pojman, the moderator of this debate], can’t be identified ostensively, extra-linguistically.

Well, let us try to identify, try to establish what this God is that we speak of and concerning whom we try to use premises to prove His existence. Let us try to identify God by means of definite descriptions, that is, intra-linguistically. Suppose we say, “God is the maker of the heavens and the earth,” or “The being transcendent to the world on whom all things depend and who depends on nothing himself,” or “the being of infinite love to whom all things are owed,” or “the infinite sustainer of the universe,” or “the heavenly father of us all.”

Now the difficulty with those definite descriptions, unlike the ones I used to identify Louis, is that with them, if you have trouble about knowing what was referred to by the word “God,” you are going to be equally puzzled about “A being transcendent to the world.” How would you identify that? Or “the being of infinite love to whom all things are owed”? How do you know what it would be like to meet such a being? What is it that you’re talking about in talking about a being of infinite love? Or “The maker of the heavens and the earth,” rather than “The maker of the pasta and the cake”? How would you know what that refers to?

What I’m trying to say is (and I don’t say these expressions are meaningless; or that they are linguistic irregularities) that they are what philosophers would call problematic conceptions. Indeed, they are so problematic and so obscure that it turns out that we don’t know what we are talking about when we use them. We have a kind of familiar pictorial sense that we know what we are talking about, but when we think very carefully about what these expressions mean, they are so problematic that we can’t use them to make true or false claims.

Suppose someone says, “Look, Nielsen, you should know better than that. God, in Judeo-Christianity and Islamic religions, is the Ultimate Mystery.” And that is almost definitional. A non-mysterious god might be the god of some form of deism, but it wouldn’t be the God of Christianity. But, if we say definitional, “God is the Ultimate Mystery,” if we are puzzled about the referent of “God,” we are going to be terribly puzzled about what is “the Ultimate Mystery.”
What are we talking about there? We need to have some account of who or what we are talking about in speaking of God. Some minimal understanding is necessary even for faith to be possible. If you have no understanding of those terms at all, then you can’t take them on faith or take them on trust, because you don’t know what to take on faith or you don’t know what to take on trust or would you use such terms in a premise. For something to be a premise in an argument, its terms must not be so problematic that we do not understand them. No matter how tight Moreland’s arguments might be, he can’t use them in premises if we don’t know what they mean. But—or so I shall argue—we don’t know what they mean.

Suppose we say, “Look, Nielsen, if you’re so bloody empiricist, what you are going to do is rule out molecular biology too.” We often explain biological phenomena in physical chemical terms. But the relevant chemical processes are unobservable. There is an important distinction to be made here. They are only contingently unobservable; there is no logical ban on the possibility of their being observed, even if we don’t know what it would be like presently to observe them. And the same thing is true about physics. There is no logical ban; they are just contingently unobservable.

In the case of God, however, anything that could be observed would not be the God of Christianity. It would be the anthropomorphic Zeus-like god that it would be superstitious to believe in. One of the responses to this is to say, “Well, God isn’t directly observable, but He is indirectly observable. You observe Him through His works and so forth and so on, through the design in the world and the like.” This, I shall add in passing, is very different than the design of the world, if indeed there is design. You observe God, it is said, indirectly in His works. But it makes no sense whatsoever to say something is indirectly observable, if it is not at least in theory or in principle directly observable as well. Suppose I say to you, “There’s a glass of water under this podium,” or, better still, suppose I say, “There’s a still over there.” And you say, “How do you know there’s a still?” “Well, can’t you see the smoke coming up?” I respond. That is, many believe, pretty good indirect evidence for there being a still. Yet, even if it is not in reality terribly good evidence, still it is reasonable indirect evidence to there being a still there. But it is only indirect evidence at all, good or bad, because you know what it would be like to observe the bloody still, and to say, “Ah, yeah, that’s what’s making the smoke.” That is plain enough, isn’t it?

But there is no directly observing of God or directly noting His existence or personally encountering God. You can’t encounter a transcendent being. (Think here literally of what you are saying.) And if so, then there is a logical ban on the very possibility of direct acquaintance with God. Being then parallel with the other cases, there can’t be any indirect observation either. It just makes no sense to say you can indirectly observe something you have no idea of what it could even mean to directly observe.

Suppose one says, by way of counter argument, “But look, mathematics’ objects are unobservable. We need numbers to do mathematics, and we need mathematics to do science.” That is, of course, perfectly true. We do need numbers to do mathematics, and we do need mathematics to do science. Still we need not reify numbers into queer Platonic objects. There is one group of mathematicians that does this, but a lot of them don’t. There is no need to make such a reification.

But suppose, all the same, we do reify numbers; that is, objectify them as to some sort of queer objects. Let us, for the sake of the argument, allow this to be legitimate—something I wouldn’t in fact allow for the moment. Let us, that is, read numbers
Platonically, and talk of numbers being eternal, of their being mathematical objects. If we do so, we cannot now, it will be claimed, say that the concept of God is incoherent. Remember, my principal basis for saying that it is irrational to believe in God is that I believe the concept of God in developed Judeo-Christianity is incoherent. I would also have to say then that to believe that there are numbers is incoherent, and that is absurd.

We can, we are now allowing, think of eternal realities, namely numbers. But God is also said to be an infinite individual, an infinite person transcendent to the universe. Acknowledging that there are eternal realities, such as numbers, gives us no purchase on this. We have no understanding of what we are talking about when we speak of an infinite person or an infinite individual transcendent to the world. Numbers, after all, are types, and not tokens, not individuals.

Let me explain what I mean by that bit of philosophical jargon. Suppose there were a blackboard here, and I wrote down the number 2 three times. How many numbers are there on the blackboard? Well, normally you would say, “There’s one number; that is, one type and three tokens, three physical representations of the word 2.” So that is the difference between the words types and tokens.

Numbers are, after all, types and not tokens, and they can be eternal objects, if you want to talk in that Platonic way. But we have no understanding of what it is for an individual, a token as distinct from a type, to be eternal, such that it could not not exist in any possible world. But God is supposed to be a person—an individual.

We compound the trouble when we speak of infinite individuals. And remember, God has to be an individual, not a type. God is not a “kind” term. “God” does not refer to a kind of reality but supposedly to an utterly unique, infinite individual. My argument is that it doesn’t make sense when you think it through. God is an infinite individual who created and sustained the world. And so even if numbers are eternal realities, and so we can give sense to eternal realities, we still haven’t given sense to an individual, a token, being an eternal reality, to say nothing of giving sense to there being an infinite individual.

The definite description, “The infinite individual who made the world,” is as puzzling as is God. Suppose it is said, “God’s reality is sui generis. God just has a distinct reality which is different from any other kind of reality. It is not like mathematical reality; it is not like physical reality and so forth.” But such talk of being sui generis is, I believe, evasive. Suppose I ask you to believe in poy, an utterly nonsensical term, a made-up word of mine. But I can’t tell you what poy is. You can’t in that circumstance, no matter how much you want to, believe in poy or have faith in poy. To do that, you would have to have some understanding of what poy is. Now what I’m trying to argue is when you really think through to what God is supposed to be, you will see that you have no more understanding of God, except as a familiarity in the language, than you have an understanding of poy. There’s no way of conceptually identifying God that isn’t equally problematic...

Suppose someone says ... “God by definition is eternal.” That’s fair enough, but it may have been eternally the case that there are no eternal individuals or persons. In saying that God is eternal, we are not saying that there are any eternal individuals or persons. We are only saying that if there is a God, He exists eternally. But of course, there might not be; there might never have been any eternal individuals or persons. Eternally, it might have been the case that there are no eternal individuals.
You need an argument to show that there must be an eternal individual or person. Professor Moreland tried to give one. To do that we must show that the very idea of there not being such a reality is self-contradictory. That seems at least to be either patently false or itself incoherent. To put it minimally, the notion of a logically necessary individual or person is itself at best problematical.

This being so, we cannot give coherent sense to the concept of God by that alleged definite description. It has been said, “Well, why couldn’t I offer any of the following: ‘God is a being which cannot not exist. “God is the being which exists in every possible world”’? But these are just alternative ways of speaking of a logically necessary individual or person, and it is this very notion that is so thoroughly problematic as to appear to be at least incoherent.

Let us go back, and I’m now about to finish, to our question at the beginning: Does God exist? If I am right in claiming that the concept of God in developed Judeo-Christian discourses is incoherent, then there can be no question of proving God’s existence or establishing that He exists. Proof requires premises and conclusions. But if the concept of God is incoherent, it cannot be used in a premise purporting to prove that God exists. Moreover, it as well, and for the same reasons, cannot be used in a conclusion purporting to have been established by premises not employing the concept of God or other religious concepts. If the concept of God in developed Judeo-Christianity is incoherent, as I have argued it is, then arguments of the ontological type, cosmological type, or design type cannot possibly get off the ground. This being so, there is no need to consider their details. But these are the standard arguments for the existence of God. Moreover, if the very idea of there being a God of the requisite type for Judeo-Christianity is incoherent, no other argument can fare any better.

To worry this out a little bit, let me argue by analogy. Suppose I say, “All married bachelors are irascible. Jones is a married bachelor. Jones is irascible.” Now that’s a valid form, but it couldn’t be a sound argument. Sound arguments are valid arguments with true premises, but if a premise is incoherent, then there can be no question of its being true. There is no need, if my argument is sound, even to look at the proof. Nothing could prove there is a round square or a married bachelor or that procrastination drinks melancholy. The very idea of such a thing is incoherent.

Before we go to the proofs or the evidence for God’s existence, the believer must show that we know what we are talking about when we speak of God. And in closing, just one more thing. We, in some not very clear way, know our way around when we speak of God anthropomorphically, as we of course learned to use God-talk as children. That gives us the illusion that we understand what we are talking about when we speak of God. We are told that God is our heavenly Father, not a father like our real father, but our heavenly Father. And what’s that? And eventually we move from anthropomorphic conceptions of God, which we do in some way understand, to nonanthropomorphic ones. When we engage in our devotions (if we do such things), the anthropomorphic ones reassert themselves and we feel comfortable that we understand what we are praying to, worshiping, and the like. But when we reflect, we realize that neither our religious nor our intellectual impulses will sustain the anthropomorphic conceptions. That way makes religion into superstition. So we are driven, when we reflect, to ever less anthropomorphic ones, but in doing so we pass over, unwittingly, in the very effort to gain a religiously adequate conception of God, to an incoherent conception. We do so de-anthropomorphize that we no longer understand what we are saying. Yet an anthropomorphic
conception of God of any sort gives us a materially tainted God which is subject to
evident empirical disconfirmation in the more obvious anthropomorphic forms,
made so pantheistic that religion is naturalized, made into what in reality is a secular
belief-system disguised in colorful language.

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