

Nietzsche and Rand:

A Comparison of Positions on 96 Issues

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Summary

96 issues included as of April 2016.

Agreements:	19
Disagreements:	70
Semi-agree/ disagree:	7

Of the agreements:

Negative agreements:	8
Positive agreements:	11

Bibliography

Nietzsche's works cited	Rand's works cited
A <i>The Antichrist</i> [1888]	AF <i>The Art of Fiction</i> (2000)
BGE <i>Beyond Good & Evil</i> [1886]	AF <i>The Art of Nonfiction</i> (2001)
BT <i>The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music</i> [1872]	ARL <i>The Ayn Rand Letter</i> (1971-1976)
CW <i>The Case of Wagner</i> [1888]	AS <i>Atlas Shrugged</i> (1957)
D <i>Daybreak</i> [1881]	CUI <i>Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal</i> (1966)
EH <i>Ecce Homo</i> [written 1888]	FNI <i>For the New Intellectual</i> (1961)
GM <i>Genealogy of Morals</i> [1887]	ITOE <i>Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology</i> (1979)
GS <i>The Gay Science</i> [1882]	JAR <i>Journals of Ayn Rand</i> (1997)
HA <i>Human All-Too-Human</i> [1878]	NL <i>The New Left: The Anti-Industrial Revolution</i> (1971)
SE <i>Schopenhauer as Educator</i> [1874]	PWNI <i>Philosophy: Who Needs It</i> (1982)

SSW <i>The Struggle Between Science and Wisdom</i>	RM <i>The Romantic Manifesto</i> (1969)
TFEMS <i>Truth and Falsehood in an Extra-moral Sense</i>	TO <i>The Objectivist</i> (1966-1971)
TI <i>Twilight of the Idols</i> [1888]	TON <i>The Objectivist Newsletter</i> (1962-1965)
WP <i>The Will to Power</i> [1889; unpublished in Nietzsche's lifetime]	VOS <i>The Virtue of Selfishness</i> (1964)
WS <i>The Wanderer and His Shadow</i> [1880]	WTL <i>We the Living</i> (1936/1959)
Z <i>Thus Spake Zarathustra</i> [1883-85]	

Issue	Nietzsche's position	Rand's position
Metaphysics		
Fundamental stuff of the universe	"the innermost essence of being is will to power" (<i>WP</i> 693) Materialism. Importance of Friedrich Lange's <i>The History of Materialism</i> (1866): "Nietzsche's first reaction was that it was undoubtedly the most significant philosophical work to have appeared in the last hundred years" (postscript to a letter of February 1866 to Hermann Mushacke, in Hayman 1980, 82)	No armchair physics. "'Cosmology' has to be thrown out of philosophy." (<i>JAR</i> 698, emphasis in original)
Entity or process	Process (<i>WP</i> 552, 1067; <i>BGE</i> 54); "the lie of unity, the lie of thinghood, of substance, of permanence." (<i>TI</i> "Reason" in Philosophy 2) "there is no 'being' behind doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything." This substance/action ontology leads people to maintain the belief that "the strong man is free to be weak and the bird of prey to be a lamb—for thus they gain the right to make the bird of prey <i>accountable</i> for being a bird of prey." (<i>GM</i> 1:13)	Entities as objective; no armchair physics (<i>GS</i> , <i>FNI</i> , pb 125; <i>ITOE</i> , 18; <i>JAR</i> 698)
Monism, dualism, or pluralism	Monism (<i>WP</i> 1067); "Descartes was the first to have dared, with admirable boldness, to understand the animal as <i>machine</i> ; the whole of our physiology endeavors to prove this claim. And we are consistent enough not to except man, as Descartes still did" (<i>A14</i>)	Naturalism: no armchair physics (<i>JAR</i> 698)
Identity	No (<i>WP</i> 507-517)	Yes (<i>GS</i> , <i>FNI</i> , 152, pb 125; 186, pb 150; 188; pb 152; 192, pb 154; <i>ITOE</i> , 78, 6)
Identity and change compatible	No (<i>WP</i> 520)	Yes (<i>GS</i> , <i>FNI</i> , 192, pb 154)
Causality	No (<i>WP</i> 497, 545-552) . <i>GS</i> 112 Yet regular reductionist causal explanations Not "mechanistic": "Let us even beware of believing the universe is a machine: it is certainly not constructed for one purpose, and calling it a 'machine' does it far too much honor." (<i>GS</i> 109)	Yes (<i>GS</i> , <i>FNI</i> , 188, pb 151; "The Metaphysical vs. the Man-Made," <i>PWNI</i> , 30; pb 25)

Teleology	No (<i>WP</i> 552, 1067, Postcard to Overbeck)	Yes for organisms (<i>VOS</i> , 6, pb 16; <i>ITOE</i> , 42)
Direction to evolution	Yes (<i>GM</i> II:24)	No armchair physics <i>or</i> biology
Existence of God	No (<i>GS</i> 108; 125)	No (<i>GS</i> , <i>FNI</i> , 184; pb 148)
Consciousness as functional/useful	Yes (<i>WP</i> 505)	Yes (<i>VOS</i> , 9, pb 18; <i>ITOE</i> , 38)
Consciousness as causal	No (<i>WP</i> 477-478, 524); not an independent agent controlling itself, the body but a passive reflector and "nothing but a <i>certain behaviour of the instincts toward one another</i> " (<i>GS</i> 333) ; as merely a felt effect of struggle among instincts for supremacy (<i>WP</i> 677) "The 'inner world' is full of phantoms and will-o'-the-wisps: the will is one of them. The will no longer moves anything, hence does not explain anything either—it merely accompanies events; it can also be absent. The so-called <i>motive</i> : another error. Merely a surface phenomenon of consciousness, something alongside the deed that is more likely to cover up the antecedents of the deeds than to represent them. And as for the <i>ego</i> ! That has become a fable, a fiction, a play on words: it has altogether ceased to think, feel, or will. "What follows from this? There are no mental causes at all." (<i>TI</i> "The Four Great Errors" 3)	Yes ("The Metaphysical vs. the Man-Made," <i>PWNI</i> , 30, pb 25)
Psychology reduced to biology	Yes: <i>GS</i> 134 and 145 on diet, drink, and air quality, as explaining the spread of pessimistic, nihilist philosophies. "Europe would never have become Christian in the first place if the culture of the ancient world in the south had not gradually been barbarized through an excessive admixture of Teutonic barbarian blood, thus losing its cultural superiority." (<i>GS</i> 149)	No
Epistemology		
Consciousness as identification	No (<i>BGE</i> 211; <i>WP</i> 473, 479, 481, 507, 511, 513, 516, 521); the "ridiculous overestimation and misunderstanding of consciousness" (<i>GS</i> 11); <i>GM</i> II:16 Consciousness as a <i>defense</i> mechanism against reality, not a <i>cognitive</i> mechanism. Language and art as shields, as comforting illusions.	Yes (<i>GS</i> , <i>FNI</i> , 152; pb 124; <i>ITOE</i> , 37, 73, 106)
Sensations as awareness of reality	No (<i>WP</i> 479) <i>Daybreak</i> 117: "In prison. ""The habits of our senses have woven us into lies and deception of sensation: these again are the basis of all our judgments and 'knowledge'—there is absolutely no escape, no backway or bypath in the the <i>real world</i> !" Yes: "they [the senses] do not lie at all. What we make of their testimony, that alone introduces lies; for example the lie of unity, the lie of thinghood, of substance, of permanence. 'Reason' is the cause of our falsification of the testimony of the senses. Insofar as the senses show becoming, passing away, and change, they do not lie. The 'apparent' world is the only one: the 'true' world is merely added by a lie." (<i>TI</i> "Reason" in Philosophy 2)	Yes (<i>ITOE</i> , 5; "Kant Versus Sullivan," <i>PWNI</i> , 108, pb 90)

Sensations as value laden	Yes (<i>WP</i> 505)	No (<i>GS</i> , <i>FNI</i> , 194, pb 156)
Concepts as awareness of reality	No (<i>WP</i> 507, 513). Language as inadequate to reality (<i>TI Skirmishes</i> 26)	Yes (<i>ITOE</i> , 71)
Logic as reality-based	No (<i>WP</i> 477, 512); <i>GS</i> 111	Yes (<i>GS</i> , <i>FNI</i> , 153, pb 125; "Philosophical Detection," <i>PWNI</i> , 17, pb 15)
Sensations, concepts and theories as impositions upon reality	Always (<i>WP</i> 515-516)	Sensations never; false conceptions only (<i>ITOE</i> , 65; <i>GS</i> , <i>FNI</i> , 154, pb 126)
Truth	<p>As functional only (<i>WP</i> 487); as a useful error (<i>WP</i> 493); "These Nay-sayers and outsiders of today who are unconditional on one point—their insistence on intellectual cleanliness, these hard, severe, abstinent heroic spirits who constitute the honor of our age; all these pale atheists, anti-Christians, immoralists, nihilists, ephectics, hectics of the spirit . . . they certainly believe they are as completely liberated from the ascetic ideal as possible, these "free, very free spirits" . . . They are far from being free spirits: for they still have faith in the truth" (<i>GM</i> III.24).</p> <p>"The demand for an <i>adequate mode of expression</i> is <i>senseless</i>: it lies in the essence of a language, as a means of expression, to express a mere relationship—the concept 'truth' is <i>nonsensical</i>." (<i>WP</i> 625)</p> <p>"Thus the <i>strength</i> of knowledge does not depend on its degree of truth but on its age, on the degree to which it has been incorporated, on its character as a condition of life." (<i>GS</i> 110)</p> <p>"The conditions of life might include error." (<i>GS</i> 121)</p> <p>"What are man's truths ultimately? Merely his irrefutable errors." (<i>GS</i> 265)</p> <p>"Truths are illusions whose illusoriness is overlooked." (<i>TFEMS</i>, q. Hayman 164)</p>	Both as identification and as functional (<i>ITOE</i> , 63, 65; <i>GS</i> , <i>FNI</i> , 154, pb 126; "Philosophical Detection," <i>PWNI</i> , 16, pb 14)
Self-knowledge	<p>No: "The so-called 'ego!'"</p> <p>"We are none of us that which we appear to be in accordance with the states for which alone we have consciousness and words, and consequently praise and blame; those cruder outbursts of which alone we are aware make us <i>misunderstand</i> ourselves, we draw a conclusion on the basis of data in which the exceptions outweigh the rule, we misread ourselves in this apparently most intelligible of handwriting on the nature of our self." (<i>D</i> 115)</p> <p>"The unknown world of the 'subject!'" (<i>D</i> 116)</p> <p>"every action is unknowable" (<i>GS</i> 335)</p> <p>"However far a man may go in self-knowledge, nothing however can be more incomplete than his image of the totality of <i>drives</i> which constitute his being." (<i>D</i> 119)</p> <p>"Our thinking is only a picture of the primal intellect, a thinking that arises from the ideas of the single will . . . I believe in the incomprehensibility of the will." (q in Hayman 136-7)</p> <p>How does the above fit with <i>BGE</i> 6 which claims deep</p>	Yes: Introspective skills. Conscious and subconscious. Psychological role of art in cognition. Friendship and love: "visibility".

	knowledge of self based on knowledge of surface philosophy?	
Reason as efficacious	<p>Weakly at best: "[B]y far the greatest part of our spirit's activity remains unconscious and unfelt" (<i>GS</i> 333; cf. <i>GS</i> 354). "Actions are never what they appear to us to be! We have expended so much labor on learning that external things are not as they appear to us to be — very well! the case is the same with the inner world! Moral actions are in reality 'something other than that'—more we cannot say: and all actions are essentially unknown." (<i>D</i> 116); "[I]n this new world they no longer possessed their former guides, their regulating, unconscious and infallible drives: they were reduced to thinking, inferring, reckoning, co-ordinating cause and effect, these unfortunate creatures; they were reduced to their 'consciousness,' their weakest and most fallible organ!" (<i>GM</i> II:16)</p> <p>What we make of [the senses'] testimony, that alone introduces lies; for example the lie of unity, the lie of thinghood, of substance, of permanence. 'Reason' is the cause of our falsification of the testimony of the senses. Insofar as the senses show becoming, passing away, and change, they do not lie. The 'apparent' world is the only one: the 'true' world is merely added by a lie." (<i>TI</i> "Reason" in Philosophy 2)</p>	Yes ("The Left: Old and New," <i>NL</i> , 84)
Reason as primary cognitive tool	No (<i>GS</i> 354; <i>GM</i> II:16)	Yes (<i>GS</i> , <i>FNI</i> , 156, pb 128; <i>VOS</i> , 13, pb 20)
Instinct as cognitively efficacious	Yes (<i>GM</i> II:16); "'instinct' is of all the kinds of intelligence that have been discovered so far—the most intelligent." (<i>BGE</i> 218) "Instinct is the best" and "Our deeds must happen unconsciously" (Sixth "Self-Observation" aphorism of 1868; q in Hayman 103)	No (<i>GS</i> , <i>FNI</i> , 148, pb 121; <i>VOS</i> , 11, pb 19; 23, pb 27)
Philosophy reduced to psychology	<p>Yes (<i>BGE</i> I:3,23);</p> <p>"Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir". "In the philosopher, conversely, there is nothing whatever that is impersonal; and above all, his morality bears decided and decisive witness to <i>who he is</i>— that is, in what order of rank the innermost drives of his nature stand in relation to each other." (<i>BGE</i> 6)</p> <p>"our moral judgments and evaluations too are only images and fantasies based on a physiological process unknown to us" (<i>D</i> 119)</p> <p>"the <i>physiological</i> phenomenon behind the moral predispositions and prejudices" (<i>D</i> 542)</p> <p>"most of the conscious thinking of a philosopher is secretly guided and forced into certain channels by his instincts." (<i>BGE</i> 3)</p>	No
Philosophy as systematic	<p>Yes: "We [philosophers] have no right to isolated acts of any kind: we may not make isolated errors or hit upon isolated truths. Rather do our ideas, our values, our yeas and nays, our ifs and buts, grow out of us with the necessity with which a tree bears fruit— related and each with an affinity to each, and evidence of one will, one health, one soil, one sun." (<i>GM</i>, Preface: 2)</p> <p>No: "<i>Beware of systematizers!</i>— There is a play-acting of systematizers: ... they will to impersonate complete</p>	Yes ("The Chicken's Homecoming," <i>NL</i> , 107)

	<p>and uniformly strong natures." (<i>D</i> 318)</p> <p>"I mistrust all systematizers and I avoid them. The will to system is a lack of integrity" (<i>TI</i> Maxims and Arrows 26)</p> <p>Issue of organic growth versus top-down intellectualized imposition?</p>	
Philosophy and Science relationship	<p>Continuity and strong overlap of content; Anti-<i>a-priori</i> speculation.</p> <p>"Today we possess science precisely to the extent to which we have decided to <i>accept</i> the testimony of the senses—to the extent to which we sharpen them further, arm them, and have learned to think them through." (<i>TI</i> Reason 3)</p> <p>Development: pro-science in 70s (<i>HAA</i>), then Kantian/Schopenhaurian skepticism about the noumenal (e.g., <i>BGE</i> 21); then denies noumenal/phenomenal distinction in <i>TI</i> ("How the 'True World' Finally Became a Fable")</p> <p>"the <i>ideal</i> scholar in whom the scientific instinct, after thousands of total and semi-failures, for once blossoms and blooms to the end, is certainly one of the most precious instruments there are; but he belongs in the hand of one more powerful" (<i>BGE</i> 207; the one more powerful being a philosopher-creator)</p> <p><i>GM</i> 3: 25: "No! Don't come to me with science when I ask for the natural antagonist of the ascetic ideal ..." and: "all science ... has at present the object of dissuading man from his former respect for himself ..."</p>	<p>Continuity but sharper division of labor. E.g., on evolution.</p> <p>Anti-<i>a-priori</i> speculation</p> <p>Inductive evidence's role.</p>
Intrinsicism	False (<i>GM</i> III:12; <i>BGE</i> 207)	False ("What is Capitalism?"; <i>CUI</i> , 21)
Objectivism	False (<i>GM</i> III:12); Objectivity versus self-identity: "The objective man is indeed a mirror: he is accustomed to submit before whatever wants to be known." He is "only a delicate, carefully dusted, fine, mobile pot for forms that still has to wait for some content and substance in order to 'shape' itself accordingly—for the most part, a man without substance and content, a 'selfless' man." (<i>BGE</i> 207)	True ("Introducing Objectivism," <i>TON</i> , Aug 1962, 35)
Subjectivism	True: "Genuine philosophers, however, are commanders and legislators: they say, 'thus it shall be! Their 'knowing is creating, their creating is a legislation, their will to truth is—will to power.'" (<i>BGE</i> 211). But not in the dualistic sense (<i>WP</i> 481). "One thing is needful—To 'give style' to one's character—a great and rare art! In the end, when the work is finished, it becomes evident how the constraint of a single taste governed and formed everything large and small. Whether this taste was good or bad is less important than one might suppose, if only it was a single taste!" (<i>GS</i> 290)	False (<i>GS</i> , <i>FNI</i> , 187, pb 150)
Perspectivalism/Relativism	True (<i>GM</i> III:12; <i>WP</i> 540) ; "Egoism is the law of perspective applied to feelings: what is closest appears large and weighty, and as one moves farther away size and weight decrease." (<i>GS</i> 162)	False
Faith	No: "Faith is always most desired, most pressingly needed, where there is a lack of will ... that is to say, the less a person knows how to command, the more urgent his desire for that which commands, and commands sternly,—a God, prince, caste, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience." (<i>GS</i> 347)	Irresponsible

	"Prayer has been invented for those people who really never have thoughts of their own and who do not know any elevation of the soul or at least do not notice when it occurs" (GS 128)	
Skepticism	As non-committalism: "skepticism is the most spiritual expression of a complex physiological condition that in ordinary language is called nervous exhaustion and sickness [<i>Kränklichkeit</i>]" (BGE 208)	No
Evolutionary epistemology	" <i>Origin of knowledge.</i> —Over immense periods of time the intellect produced nothing but errors. A few of these proved to be useful and helped to preserve the species: those who hit upon or inherited these had better luck in their struggles for themselves and their progeny. Such erroneous articles of faith ..." (GS 110)	Circularity issue
Language	Language cannot be transparent: "for between two absolutely disparate spheres such as subject and object there can be no connections which are causal, precise or expressive, but nothing more than an <i>aesthetic</i> interaction, I mean, the transmission of hints, a stumbling translation into a wholly foreign language, for which we invariably need a freely poeticizing and freely inventive intermediate faculty an intermediate area." (TFEMS)	Cognitive and functional
Science as useful falsehoods	" <i>Science furthers ability, not knowledge.</i> " (HAH 256) "It is precisely the best science that will best know how to keep us in this <i>simplified</i> , utterly artificial, well-invented, well-falsified world, how unwillingly willing science loves error because, being alive,—it loves life!" (BGE 24)	No
Human Nature		
Reduction of morality to psychology	Yes (BGE 6; GMI:10?); one's moral code is a "decisive witness to who he is", to the "innermost drives of his nature" (BGE 6). "Moral judgments," he says are, "symptoms and sign languages which betray the process of physiological prosperity or failure" (WP 258). "[O]ur moral judgments and evaluations...are only images and fantasies based on a physiological process unknown to us" (D 119); "it is always necessary to draw forth...the physiological phenomenon behind the moral predispositions and prejudices" (D 542); "There is only aristocracy of birth, only aristocracy of blood" (WP 942)	No (VOS, 16, pb 23; "The Psychology of 'Psychologizing,'" TO, March 1971, 2)
Reduction of psychology to biology	Yes (TI 33; WP 529); "One cannot erase from the soul of a human being what his ancestors liked most to do and did most constantly" (BGE 260); "Descartes was the first to have dared, with admirable boldness, to understand the animal as <i>machine</i> ; the whole of our physiology endeavors to prove this claim. And we are consistent enough not to except man, as Descartes still did" (A14); "Wherever a deep discontent with existence becomes prevalent, it is the after-effects of some great dietary mistake made by a whole people over a long period of time that are coming to light" (GS 134)	No (GS, FVI, 148, pb 121)
Individual as a unity	No. The human is the combat of "a vast confusion of contradictory valuations and consequently of contradictory drives" (WP 259) Should strive for the dominance of one: "here the co-ordination of the inner systems and their operation in the service of one end is best achieved" (WP 778); "The assumption of one single subject is perhaps unnecessary" (WP 490);	Yes

	consciousness is not "the unity of the organism" (<i>GS</i> 11)	
Individual as real	No: "For the individual, the 'single man,' as people and philosophers have hitherto understood him, is an error; he does not constitute a separate entity, an atom, a 'link in the chain,' something merely inherited from the past—he constitutes the entire single line 'man' up to and including himself" (<i>TI</i> 9.33)	Yes ("The soul of an individualist," <i>FNI</i> , 91; pb 78; "What is Capitalism," <i>CUI</i> , 15)
Will as primary	Yes (<i>WP</i> 1067)	No
Free will	<p>No (<i>BGE</i> 21; <i>GM</i> II:10: no "guilt," only sickness; Postcard to Overbeck); "the concept of a <i>causa sui</i> is something fundamentally absurd" (<i>BGE</i> 15), and that it is "the best self-contradiction that has been conceived so far...a sort of rape and perversion of logic" (<i>BGE</i> 21); the desire for "freedom of the will" in the superlative metaphysical sense ... the desire to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility for one's actions oneself, and to absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance, and society involves nothing less than to be precisely this <i>causa sui</i> and ... to pull oneself up into existence by the hair, out of the swamps of nothingness" (<i>BGE</i> 21); "at the bottom of us, really 'deep down,' there is, of course, something unteachable, some granite of spiritual <i>fatum</i>, of predetermined decision and answer to predetermined questions. Whenever a cardinal problem is at stake, there speaks an unchangeable 'this is I.' (<i>BGE</i> 231); we are before "a brazen wall of fate; we <i>are</i> in prison, we can only <i>dream</i> ourselves free, not make ourselves free" (<i>HAA</i> 2:33); One of "The Four Great Errors" is free will (<i>TI</i> "The Four Great Errors" 7). "the single human being is a piece of <i>fatum</i> from the front and from the rear, one law more, one necessity more for all that is yet to come and to be. To say to him, 'Change yourself!' is to demand that everything be changed, even retroactively." (<i>TI</i> 'Morality as Anti-Nature' 6); "the voluntary is absolutely lacking ... everything has been directed along certain lines from the beginning" (<i>WP</i> 458); "one will become only that which one is (in spite of all: that means education, instruction, milieu, chance, and accident)" (<i>WP</i> 334); "A man as he ought to be: that sounds to us as insipid as 'a tree as he ought to be'" (<i>WP</i> 332). "There is only aristocracy of birth, only aristocracy of blood" (<i>WP</i> 942); "perhaps there exists neither will nor purposes, and we have only imagined them. Those iron hands of necessity which shake the dice-box of chance play their game for an infinite length of time; so there <i>have</i> to be throws which exactly resemble purposiveness and rationality of every degree. <i>Perhaps</i> our acts of will and our purposes are nothing but just such throws—and we are only too limited and too vain to comprehend our extreme limitedness: which consists in the fact that we ourselves shake the dice-box with iron hands, that we ourselves in our most intentional actions do no more than play the game of necessity." (<i>D</i> 130) Opening line of <i>EH</i>: "The good fortune of my existence 'lies in its fatality.'" (<i>EH</i> 'Why I am so Wise', 1) "It was a lucky fact of nature that I, Nietzsche, was a healthy organism, that is, the type of creature that instinctively does the right things to facilitate its flourishing." (<i>EH</i> 'Why I am so Wise', 2); "<i>Amor fati</i>: Let that be my love henceforth!" (<i>GS</i> 276)</p> <p>Yes: "We ... want to become those we are—human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves." (<i>GS</i> 335)</p> <p>Stoic fatalism? One controls only one's response to</p>	Yes ("The Objectivist Ethics" <i>VOS</i> , 13, pb 21)

	one's fate?	
Reason and passion/emotion priority	Passion/emotion has priority (<i>BGE</i> 36, 68, 158, 191) Thinking is only "the form in which we come to feel" (<i>GS</i> 333). "Thoughts are the shadows of our feelings—always darker, emptier, and simpler." (<i>GS</i> 179)	Reason primary ("The Left: Old and New," <i>NL</i> , 84; "Playboy's Interview with Ayn Rand," pamphlet, 6)
Reason and passion/emotion relationship	Conflict (<i>EH</i> : "The Birth of Tragedy" 1): "'Rationality' against instinct") Hayman on <i>GS</i> 55: The noble individual does not proceed according to reason: when he is magnanimous or self-sacrificing, it is his instincts he is following, and when he is brave it is not for the sake of winning honours. His overflowing magnanimity empowers him to be generous." (237)	Should be harmony ("Playboy's Interview with Ayn Rand," pamphlet, 6)
<i>Tabula rasa</i> or nativism	Strong nativism (<i>BGE</i> 231, 264) ; Self-creation: "The one thing needful. – There is one thing one has to have: either a cheerful disposition by nature of a <i>disposition made cheerful</i> by art and knowledge." (<i>HAH</i> 486)	Cognitive and moral <i>tabula rasa</i> (<i>VOS</i> , 23, pb 28; "The Comprachios," <i>NL</i> , 190)
Science as ennobling	No: "all science ... has at present the object of dissuading man from his former respect for himself ..." (<i>GM</i> III:25) Yes: <i>GS</i> 293	Yes
Ethics		
Morality in the service of life	Yes (<i>BGE</i> , <i>GM</i>)	Yes (<i>VOS</i> , 16, pb 23)
Psychological egoism	Yes (<i>BGE</i>); "Is it virtuous when a cell transforms itself into a function of a stronger cell? It has no alternative. Is it evil when a stronger cell assimilates the weaker? It also has no alternative; it follows necessity ..." (<i>GS</i> 118) No: "For what does one have to atone most? For one's modesty; for having failed to listen to one's most personal requirements; for having mistaken oneself; for having underestimated oneself; for having lost a good war for one's instincts: this lack of reverence for oneself revenges itself through every kind of deprivation: health, friendship, well-being, pride, cheerfulness, freedom, firmness, courage. One never afterward forgives oneself for this lack of genuine egoism: one takes it for an objection, for a doubt about a real ego." (<i>WP</i> 918)	No ("Introduction," <i>VOS</i> , xiii, pb ix)
Psychological altruism	Yes: "'Not to seek one's own advantage'—that is merely the moral fig leaf for quite a different, namely, a physiological state of affairs: 'I no longer know how to <i>find</i> my own advantage.' Disintegration of the instincts! Man is finished when he becomes altruistic. Instead of saying naively, 'I am no longer worth anything,' the moral lie in the mouth of the decadent says, 'Nothing is worth anything, life is not worth anything.' Such a judgment always remains very dangerous, it is contagious: throughout the morbid soil of society it soon proliferates into a tropical vegetation of concepts—now as a religion (Christianity), now as a philosophy (Schopenhaurism)." (<i>TI</i> Skirmishes 35) Yes: <i>GS</i> 119 speaks of those who desire only to be a function of others. The above two as representative of N's descriptive and	No.

	<p>normative uses of the same concepts: third-person description of the phenomenon and first-person evaluation of the phenomenon from the perspective of his moral-psycho-biological type.</p> <p>Nietzsche has two theses: 1. Egoism as universal and natural. All have will to power. But not all are equal. So altruism as the egoism of the weak. 2. Egoism as not universal: physiological sickness causing a will to nothingness and then moral nihilism. Altruism as the will to nothingness of the weak. Which is it—1 or 2?</p>	
Conflict of interest the fundamental social fact	<p>Yes: "Here one must think profoundly to the very basis and resist all sentimental weakness: life itself is <i>essentially</i> appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of peculiar forms, incorporation and at the least, putting it mildest, exploitation—but why should one for ever use precisely these words on which for ages a disparaging purpose has been stamped?" "[P]eople now rave everywhere, even under the guise of science, about coming conditions of society in which 'the exploiting character' is to be absent:—that sounds to my ear as if they promised to invent a mode of life which should refrain from all organic functions." (<i>BGE</i> 259); Will to power "can manifest itself only against resistances; therefore it seeks that which resists it" (<i>WP</i> 656) ; "The well-being of the majority and the well-being of the few are opposite viewpoints of value," (<i>GM</i>, end of First Essay note). "There is no egoism that remains by itself and does not encroach 'One furthers one's I always at the expense of others'" ; alternative translation: 369: "'One furthers one's ego always at the expense of others' (<i>WP</i> 369) ; (cf. <i>BGE</i> 265)</p>	No: Reason and production increase value; Reason and emotion harmonizable.
Inequalities of power as key social fact	<p>Yes: Life is "defined as an enduring form of processes of the establishment of force, in which the different contenders grow unequally" (<i>WP</i> 642)</p>	No
Values as intrinsic	No (<i>GM</i> I:10)	No (<i>VOS</i> ; "What is Capitalism," <i>CUI</i> , 22)
Values as objective	No	Yes (<i>VOS</i> ; "What is Capitalism," <i>CUI</i> , 22)
Values as subjective	<p>Yes (<i>BGE</i> 260?); "Whatever has value in our world now does not have value in itself, according to its nature—nature is always value-less, but has been given value at some time" (<i>GS</i> 301); one's moral code is a "decisive witness to who he is", to the "innermost drives of his nature" (<i>BGE</i> 6). "Moral judgments," he says are, "symptoms and sign languages which betray the process of physiological prosperity or failure" (<i>WP</i> 258). "[O]ur moral judgments and evaluations...are only images and fantasies based on a physiological process unknown to us" (<i>D</i> 119); "it is always necessary to draw forth...the physiological phenomenon behind the moral predispositions and prejudices" (<i>D</i> 542) ; "justice ... is by all means a matter of taste, nothing more" (<i>GS</i> 184)</p>	No ("What is Capitalism," <i>CUI</i> , 22)
Values as universal	<p>No. Slave morality is "the prudence of the lowest order" (<i>GM</i> I:13). "The ideas of the herd should rule in the herd—but not reach out beyond it" (<i>WP</i> 287)</p> <p>"That lambs dislike great birds of prey does not seem strange: only it gives no grounds for reproaching these birds of prey for bearing off little lambs. And if the lambs say among themselves: 'these birds of prey are evil; and whoever is least like a bird of prey, but rather</p>	Yes

	<p>its opposite, a lamb—would he not be good?" there is no reason to find fault with this institution of an ideal, except perhaps that the birds of prey might view it a little ironically and say: 'we don't dislike them at all, these good little lambs; we even love them: nothing is more tasty than a tender lamb.'" (<i>GM</i> 1:13)</p> <p>"Not one of these clumsy, conscience-stricken herd animals (who set out to treat egoism as a matter of general welfare) wants to know ... that what is right for someone <i>absolutely</i> cannot be right for someone else; that the requirement that there be a single morality for everyone is harmful precisely to the higher men; in short, that there is an <i>order of rank</i> between people, and between moralities as well. (<i>BGE</i> 228)</p>	
Value/virtue relationship	Priority of virtue. Values created by characters of a type.	Priority of value.
Virtue	<p>"And verily I do not even teach that virtue is its own reward.... You are <i>too pure</i> to be sullied with the words revenge, punishment, reward, retribution. You love your virtue, as a mother does her child, and whoever heard of a mother wanting to be paid for her love? Your virtue is your self, not something alien." (<i>Z</i>"On the Virtuous")</p> <p>N's is an <i>activist</i> Stoicism. A cheerful <i>Byronic</i> fatalism.</p>	Virtues as means to value ends.
Individuals responsible for their characters	No (<i>BGE</i> 264). "Weakness of the will: that is a simile that can mislead. For there is no will, and consequently neither a strong nor a weak will. The multiplicity and disintegration of the impulses, the lack of system among them results in a 'weak will'; their coordination under the dominance of a single one results in a 'strong will'" (<i>WP</i> 46).	Yes
Individuals responsible for their actions	No and yes. See Free will.	Yes ("Causality versus Duty," <i>PWNI</i> , 118, pb 98)
Individuals as ends in themselves	<p>Yes (<i>BGE</i> 287);</p> <p>No (<i>WP</i> 287); every living being "is only a <i>means</i> to something; it is the expression of forms of the growth of power" (<i>WP</i> 706) ; 13: "A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength—life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent results" (<i>BGE</i> 13); every "living creature values many things higher than life itself; yet out of this evaluation itself speaks—the will to power" (<i>Z</i> 2:12) ; "Not 'mankind' but <i>overman</i> is the goal!" (<i>WP</i> 1001) ; Morality is a social product: it arises "when a greater individual or a collective-individual, for example the society, the state, subjugates all other single ones ... and orders them into a unit." (<i>HH</i> 1.99)</p>	Yes
Individual life as the standard	<p>No (<i>BGE</i> 188); "Beginning with Socrates, the individual all a once began to take himself too seriously" (<i>SSW</i> 132) ;</p> <p>"My philosophy aims at ordering of rank not at an individualistic morality" (<i>WTP</i> 287).</p> <p>"For the question is this: how can your life, the individual life, retain the highest value, the deepest significance? ... Only by your living for the good of the rarest and most valuable specimens and not for the good of the majority." (<i>SE</i>)</p> <p>The free spirit: "Such a spirit who has <i>become free</i> stands amid the cosmos with a joyous and trusting</p>	Yes ("The Soul of an Individualist," <i>FNI</i> , 96, pb 82; "Racism," <i>VOS</i> , 176, pb 129); (<i>VOS</i> , 7, pb 17)

	<p>fatalism, in the <i>faith</i> that only the particular is loathsome, and that all is redeemed and affirmed in the whole—<i>he does not negate any more</i>. Such a faith, however, is the highest of all possible faiths: I have baptized it with the name of <i>Dionysus</i>." (<i>TI</i> Skirmishes 49)</p> <p><i>HH</i> 2.89: community more valuable than individual, and to create that which is enduring is the goal; morality is for that purpose: to limit and channel the individual. This, e.g., was the great accomplishment of the Roman Empire (<i>A</i> 58)</p>	
Human life as the standard	<p>No: "Those who care most today ask: 'How are human beings to be preserved?' But Zarathustra is the only one and the first one to ask: 'How shall human being be <i>overcome</i>?' The overman is in my heart, that is my first and my only concern—and <i>not</i> human beings Oh my brothers, what I am able to love in human beings is that they are a going over and a going under." (<i>Z</i> IV "On the Higher Man")</p>	Yes
Sacrificing self to others	<p>Yes, if a weakling (<i>TI</i> 33).</p> <p>Zarathustra says: "The overman is the sense of the earth I love those who sacrifice themselves for the earth, that the earth may some day become the overman's." (<i>Z</i> I.P.3)</p>	No (<i>GS</i> , <i>FNI</i> , 172; pb 139)
Sacrificing others to self	<p>Yes, if strong (<i>WP</i> 369, 982) ; "To ordinary human beings, finally—the vast majority who exist for service and the general advantage, and who <i>may</i> exist only for that" (<i>BGE</i> 61) ; "egoism belongs to the nature of a noble soul—I mean that unshakable faith that to a being such as 'we are' other beings must be subordinate by nature and have to sacrifice themselves." (<i>BGE</i> 265)</p>	No ("Introduction," <i>VOS</i> , xii, pb ix)
The improvement of the species as the end	<p>Yes (<i>BGE</i> 126; <i>Z</i> Prologue: 4) ; "mankind in the mass sacrificed to the prosperity of a single stronger species of man — that would be an advance." (<i>GM</i> II:12)</p> <p>"Behold, I teach you the overman. The overman is the meaning of the earth. Let your will say: the overman shall be the meaning of the earth!" (<i>Z</i>, Prologue, § 3).</p> <p>"I write for a species of man that does not yet exist: for the 'masters of the earth'" (<i>WP</i> 958)</p>	No
Sacrificing some for the sake of the species	<p>Yes (<i>BGE</i> 62; <i>WP</i> 246; <i>GM</i> II:12) ; "All-too-many live, and all-too-long they hang on their branches. Would that a storm came to shake all this worm-eaten rot from the tree!" (<i>Z</i>, First Part); a healthy aristocracy "accepts with a good conscience the sacrifice of untold human beings, who, <i>for its sake</i>, must be reduced and lowered to incomplete human beings, to slaves, to instruments" (<i>BGE</i> 258); "a conqueror- and master-race which, organized for war and with the force to organize unhesitatingly lays its terrible claws upon a populace perhaps tremendously superior in numbers but still formless and wandering." (<i>GM</i> II:17) ; N seeks "a noble mode of thought ... that believes in slavery and in many degrees of subjection as the presupposition of every higher culture" (<i>WP</i> 464); N wonders "to what extent a sacrifice of freedom, even enslavement itself, gives the basis for the bringing-forth of a <i>higher type</i>." (<i>WP</i> 859)</p>	No
Power as the end	<p>As means and end (<i>WP</i> 1067); "What is good?—All that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man." (<i>A</i> 1?) "A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength — life itself is will to</p>	<p>As means only.</p> <p>"An animal's capacity for development ends at physical maturity and thereafter its growth consists of the action necessary to maintain</p>

	<p>power; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent results" (<i>BGE</i> 13); "All that happens out of aims is reducible to the <i>aim of increasing power</i>:" (<i>WP</i> 663)</p> <p>"the <i>feeling of power</i>: this wants to <i>express itself</i>, either to us ourselves, or to other men, or to ideas or imaginary beings. The most common modes of expression are: to bestow, to mock, to destroy—all three out of a common basic drive" (<i>D</i> 356)</p>	<p>itself at a fixed level; after reaching maturity, it does not, to any significant extent, continue to grow in efficacy But man's capacity for development does not end at physical maturity His ability to think, to learn, to discover new and better ways of dealing with reality, to expand the range of his efficacy, to grow intellectually, is an open door to a road that has no end." (<i>ITOE</i> 81?)</p>
Happiness as the end	No	Yes (<i>VOS</i> , 25, pb 29; <i>GS</i> , <i>FNI</i> , 150, pb 123)
Egoism as good	<p>Depends: "<i>The natural value of egoism</i>. Self-interest is worth as much as the person who has it: in can be worth a great deal, and it can be unworthy and contemptible. Every individual may be scrutinized to see whether he represents the ascending or the descending line of life. Having made that decision, one has a canon for the worth of his self-interest. If he represents the ascending line, then his worth is indeed extraordinary—and for the sake of life as a whole, which takes a step farther through him, the care for his preservation and for the creation of the best conditions for him may even be extreme. The single one, the 'individual,' as hitherto understood by the people and the philosophers alike, is an error after all: he is nothing by himself, no atom, no 'link in the chain,' nothing merely inherited from former times; he is the whole single line of humanity up to himself. If he represents the descending development, decay, chronic degeneration, and sickness (sicknesses are, in general, the consequences of decay, not its causes), then he has small worth, and the minimum of decency requires that he take away as little as possible from those who have turned out well. He is merely their parasite." (<i>TI</i> Skimishes 33)</p> <p>"[T]he subject—the striving individual bent on furthering his egoistic purposes—can be thought of only as the enemy of art, never its source." (<i>BT</i> 5)</p> <p>Egoism among noble equals: "It is one piece of its egoism <i>more</i>, this refinement and self-limitation with its equals ... —it honors <i>itself</i> in them and in the rights it cedes to them." (<i>BGE</i> 265)</p> <p>"At the risk of annoying innocent ears I will propose this: egoism belongs to the essence of the noble soul. I mean that firm belief that other beings will, by nature, have to be subordinate to a being 'like us' and will have to sacrifice themselves. The noble soul accepts this fact of its egoism without any question-mark, and also without feeling any harshness, compulsion, or caprice in it, but rather as something that may well be grounded in the primordial law of things. If the noble soul were to try to name this phenomenon, it would call it justice itself" (<i>BGE</i> 265)</p>	Yes ("The Soul of an Individualist," <i>FNI</i> , 94, pb 81)
Altruism as bad	<p>Yes (<i>TI</i> Skirmishes 35); depends (<i>TI</i> Skirmishes 33)</p> <p>"Morality trains the individual to be a function of the herd and to ascribe value to himself only as a function." (<i>GS</i> 116)</p> <p>"No altruism!" (<i>GS</i> 119)</p>	Yes (<i>GS</i> , <i>FNI</i> , 178, pb 144; <i>VOS</i> , 33, pb 34; "Introduction," <i>VOS</i> , xii, pb ix)
Altruism as the egoism of the weak	Yes (<i>GMI</i> :8, III:14)	Ultimately, No. But used as a weapon by the weak (<i>AS</i> 142)

Rationality as a virtue	No (<i>EHT</i> : "Birth of Tragedy" 1)	Primary virtue (<i>GS</i> , <i>FNI</i> , 157, pb 128)
Selflessness	<p>Last men as disgusting: "What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?" thus asks the last man, and he blinks.</p> <p>The earth has become small, and on it hops the last man, who makes everything small. His race is as in eradicable as the flea-beetle; the last man lives longest.</p> <p>"We have invented happiness,' say the last men, and they blink" (<i>ZP</i>:5)</p> <p>"Pseudo-egoism.—Whatever they may think and say about their 'egoism', the great majority nonetheless do nothing for their ego their whole life long: what they do is done for the phantom of their ego which has formed itself in the heads of those around them and has been communicated to them;-as a consequence they all of them dwell in a fog of impersonal, semi-personal opinions, and arbitrary, as it were poetical evaluations, the one for ever in the head of someone else, and the head of this someone else again in the heads of others: a strange world of phantasms" (<i>D</i> 105)</p>	Second-handers as disgusting
Self-esteem	He who "flees from himself, hates himself, does harm to himself—he is certainly not a good man" (<i>D</i> 516)	
What makes an individual good	<p>"<i>One thing is needful.</i>—To 'give style' to one's character—a great and rare art! In the end, when the work is finished, it becomes evident how the constraint of a single taste governed and formed everything large and small. Whether this taste was good or bad is less important than one might suppose, if only it was a single taste!" (<i>GS</i> 290) [The aesthetic choice out of Kierkegaard's trichotomy.]</p> <p>The "'great man' is great owing to the free play and scope of his desires and to the yet greater power that knows how to press these magnificent monsters into service" (<i>WP</i> 933) An <i>actor</i> (not a re-actor).</p> <p>"... one could conceive of such a pleasure and power of self-determination, such a freedom of the will that the spirit would take leave of all faith and every wish for certainty, being practiced in maintaining himself on insubstantial ropes and possibilities and dancing even near abysses. Such a spirit would be the free spirit par excellence" (<i>GS</i> 347).</p> <p>Zarathustra says: "The overman is the sense of the earth I love those who sacrifice themselves for the earth, that the earth may some day become the overman's." (<i>ZI.P.3</i>)</p> <p>"The essential point is: the greatest perhaps also have great virtues, but in that case also their opposites. I believe that it is precisely through the presence of opposites, and their feelings, that the great human being, <i>the bow with the great tension</i>, arises." (<i>WP</i> 967) [Hegelian]</p> <p>"<i>What makes one heroic?</i>—Going out to meet at the same time one's highest suffering and one's highest hope." (<i>GS</i> 268)</p> <p>"<i>Greek ideal.</i>—What did the Greeks admire in Odysseus? Above all, his capacity for lying, and for cunning and terrible retribution; his being equal to contingencies; when the need be, appearing nobler than the noblest; the ability to be <i>whatever he chose</i>,</p>	"Man is a being of self-made soul." Committed to the three core values: Reason, Purpose, Self esteem. (<i>VOS</i>)

	heroic perseverance; having all means at his command; possession of intellect—his intellect is the admiration of the gods, they smile when they think of it--: all this is the Greek <i>ideal!</i> " (<i>Daybreak</i> , 306)	
What makes an individual bad	One who is a "multitude and digression of impulses ... [that] lack ... systematic order among them" (<i>WP</i> 46). Such a man is "inner ruin ... and anarchism" (<i>WP</i> 778) A <i>re-actor</i> .	Evasion
Morality as relative to psychological type	Yes (<i>BGE</i> 221) ; "the <i>physiological</i> phenomenon behind the moral predispositions and prejudices" (<i>D</i> 542)	No (<i>GS</i> , <i>FNI</i> , 156, pb 128; <i>VOS</i> , 16, pb 23)
The greatest danger to man?	The weak: "The sick represent the greatest danger for the healthy; it is not the strongest but the weakest who spell disaster for the strong." Why? "What is to be feared, what has a more calamitous effect than any other calamity, is that man should inspire not profound fear but profound nausea; also not great fear but great pity." (<i>GM</i> III:14)	The strong via sanction of the victim? E.g., Francisco claim that his greatest battle is against Dagny. The weapon of altruism (<i>AS</i> 142)
Virtues: Authenticity versus second-handers	"Are you genuine? Or merely an actor? A representative? Or that which is represented? In the end, perhaps you are merely a copy of an actor." (<i>TI</i> Maxims and Arrows 38)	<i>The Fountainhead</i>
Morality not as commands but as tools of living creatively	Yes: "We should be <i>able</i> also to stand <i>above</i> morality—and not only to <i>stand</i> with the anxious stiffness of a man who is afraid of slipping and falling any moment, but also to <i>float</i> above it and <i>play</i> ." (<i>GS</i> 107)	Yes
Contemporary moral philosophy as essentially Judeo-Christian	<i>GM</i> I	"The greatest treason of the philosophers was that they never stepped out of the Middle Ages: they never challenged the Witch Doctor's code of morality." (<i>FNI</i> 37)
<i>Ressentiment</i> and envy	<i>GM</i> I	"The Age of Envy," <i>TO</i> , July-August 1971, pp. 1057-
Wealth and virtue	Wealth creates virtue: " <i>Wealth as the Origin of a Nobility of Birth</i> . – Wealth necessarily engenders an aristocracy of race, for it permits one to select the fairest women, pay the best teachers, grants to a man cleanliness, time for physical exercises, an above all freedom from deadening labour. To this extent it creates all the conditions for the production over a few generations of a noble and fair demeanour, even noble and fair behaviour, in men: greater freedom of feeling, the absence of the wretched and petty, of abasement before breadgivers, of penny-pinching." (<i>HAH</i> 479)	Virtue creates wealth
Work and leisure	Leisure highest: " <i>Leisure and idleness</i> : ... More and more, <i>work</i> gets all good conscience on its side; the desire for joy already calls itself a 'need to recuperate' and is starting to be ashamed of itself. 'One owes it to one's health'—that is what one says when caught on an excursion in the countryside. Soon we may well reach the point where one can't give in to the desire for a <i>vita contemplativa</i> (that is, taking a walk with ideas and friends) without self-contempt and a bad conscience. Well, formerly it was the other way around: work was afflicted with a bad conscience. A	Work highest

	person of good family <i>concealed</i> the fact that he worked if need compelled him to work." (GS 329)	
Human life as significant	No. "Man is a minor, transitional animal species, which — fortunately — has had its day. Anyway, life on earth is but a moment, an incident, an exception without consequence, something which is irrelevant to the general character of the earth; the earth itself, like every star, is a hiatus between nothingness and nothingness, an event without plan, reason, will, or self-awareness, the worst kind of necessity: <i>blind</i> necessity. . . . Something in us rebels against this view; the serpent 'vanity' says to us, 'All this must be wrong <i>because</i> it is outrageous. . . . Could not all this be appearance? And, to speak with Kant, [could not] man despite all this [be something transcendent?]" (WP 303, R. Kevin Hill translation)	Yes, as most significant.
Social and Political		
Individual rights	No. "For the preservation of society, for making possible higher and highest types—the <i>inequality</i> of rights is the condition." (A 57) "Their [i.e., the healthy's] right to exist, the privilege of the full-toned bell over the false and cracked, is a thousand times greater: they alone are our warranty for the future, they alone are liable for the future of man." (GM III:14) "The invalid is a parasite on society. In a certain state it is indecent to go on living." (TI Skirmishes 36)	Yes ("Man's Rights," VOS, 124, pb 93; 122, pb 92)
On capitalism	Dehumanizing for most (D 206). Extreme inequality of wealth harmful to society. Financial markets and transportation should not be in private hands (WS 285) Work and trade (GS 31)	Moral, productive ("What is Capitalism," CUI, 20) Productiveness ("TOE" 25)
On liberalism	Nietzsche says he is "not by any means 'liberal'" (GS 377); "Liberalism: in plain language, <i>reduction to the herd animal</i> ." (TI Skirmishes 38) "My ideas do not revolve around the degree of freedom that is granted to the one or to the other or to all, but around the degree of <i>power</i> that the one or the other should exercise over others or over all, and to what extent a sacrifice of freedom, even enslavement, provides the basis for the emergence of a <i>higher type</i> ." (WP 859)	Yes
On equality	False and destructive (WP 246)	Before the law ("The Age of Envy," NL, 164)
On democracy	Bad (BGE 202): "Democracy has ever been the form of decline in organizing power." (TI Skirmishes 39). See (HAH 1.472). "[T]he <i>democratic</i> movement is the heir of the Christian movement."; it will become a tool of "a master race, the future 'masters of the earth' ... philosophical men of power and artist-tyrants' who will employ democratic Europe as their most pliant and supple instrument for getting hold of the destinies of the earth" (Note for BGE, quoted in Hunt 39)	Secondary to rights ("Collectivized Rights," VOS, 140, pb 104)
On socialism	Bad. Z 1:11 ; TI Skirmishes 34; also 37: "Socialists are <i>décadents</i> "	Bad ("The Monument Builders," VOS, 120, pb 91; 115, pb 87)
On the state:	"Whatever it says it lies." [though for N lying is not	Good if sticks within its proper limits

how it came to be and how it is justified	necessarily a bad thing]; "State I call it ... where the slow suicide of all is called life"; "Where the state ends" we can then see "the bridges of the overman." (Z, "On the New Idol") "I used the word 'state': it is obvious who is meant by this—some pack of blond beasts of prey, a conqueror and master race which, organized for war and with the ability to organize, unhesitatingly lays its terrible claws upon a populace perhaps tremendously superior in numbers but still formless and nomad. That is after all how the 'state' began on earth: I think that sentimentalism which would have it begin with a 'contract' has been disposed of." (GM II:17)	
On the role of government	Limited (D 179) or none at all: "the state ... whatever it says it lies Everything about it is false" and "Only where the state ends, there begins the human being who is not superfluous" (ZI:11)	Limited ("The Nature of Government," VOS, 147, pb 109; 149, pb 110; GS, FNI, 231, pb 183)
On the welfare state	Bad	Bad ("A Preview," ARL, I, 22, 2)
On aristocracy	Good (BGE 258); (In TI 56-57 is largely critical of the Manu caste order) "I am beginning to touch on what is serious for me, the 'European problem' as I understand it, the cultivation of a new caste that will rule Europe." (BGE 251) "Every enhancement of the type 'man' has so far been the work of an aristocratic society—and it will be so again and again—a society that believes in the long order of rank and differences in value between man and man, and that needs slavery in some sense or other." (BGE 257)	Bad
On slavery	Sometimes good (BGE 188); "Slavery is, as it seems, both in the cruder and in the more subtle sense, the indispensable means of spiritual discipline and cultivation, too." (BGE 190); A healthy aristocracy "accepts with a good conscience the sacrifice of untold human beings, who, <i>for its sake</i> , must be reduced and lowered to incomplete human beings, to slaves, to instruments" (BGE 258); N seeks "a noble mode of thought ... that believes in slavery and in many degrees of subjection as the presupposition of every higher culture" (WP 464); N wonders "to what extent a sacrifice of freedom, even enslavement itself, gives the basis for the bringing-forth of a <i>higher type</i> ." (WP 859)	Evil
Healthy state	"Strong ages, <i>noble</i> cultures, see in pity, in 'love of one's neighbor', in a lack of self and self-reliance, something contemptible." (TI Skirmishes 37) "For institutions to exist there must exist the kind of will, instinct, imperative which is anti-liberal to the point of malice" (TI Skirmishes 39)	Limited, while efficient in the performance of those limited functions.
War as good	Yes: "Preparatory human beings.—I welcome all signs that a more virile, warlike age is about to begin, which will restore honor to courage above all. For this age shall prepare the way for one yet higher, and it shall gather the strength that this higher age will require one day—the age that will carry heroism into the search for knowledge and that will wage wars for the sake of ideas and their consequences." (GS 283) "War essential. It is vain rhapsodizing and sentimentality to continue to expect much (even more, to expect a very great deal) from mankind, once it has	No ("The Wreckage of the Consensus," CUI, 224)

	<p>learned not to wage war. For the time being, we know of no other means to imbue exhausted peoples, as strongly and surely as every great war does, with that raw energy of the battleground, that deep impersonal hatred, that murderous coldbloodedness with a good conscience, that communal, organized ardor in destroying the enemy, that proud indifference to great losses, to one's own existence and to that of one's friends. That muted, earthquakelike convulsion of the soul." (<i>HA</i> 477)</p> <p>"One must learn from war: ... (2) one must learn to sacrifice many and to take one's cause seriously enough not to spare men" (<i>WP</i> 982)</p> <p>"Culture absolutely cannot do without passions, vices, and acts of malice."</p> <p>"Religious war has signified the greatest progress of the masses hitherto; for it proves that the mass has begun to treat concepts with respect." (<i>GS</i> 144)</p> <p>Also: (<i>TI</i> Skirmishes 38 on "war is a training in freedom")</p> <p>"Our liberal representatives, as is well known, lack the time for reflecting on the nature of man: else they would know that they work in vain when they work for a 'gradual decrease of the military burden.' Rather, only when this kind of need has become greatest will the kind of god be nearest who alone can help. The tree of war-glory can only be destroyed all at once, by a stroke of lightning: but lightning, as indeed you know, comes from a cloud—and from up high." (<i>WS</i> 284)</p>	
<p>Civilization as ascending or declining</p>	<p>Declining (<i>BGE</i> 202; <i>GM</i> I:11,12); but <i>Z</i> must come (<i>GM</i> II:24)</p> <p>"One hardly dares speak anymore of the will to power: it was different in Athens." (Notes 1880-81, x, 414)</p>	<p>Currently declining; future could go either way</p>
<p>Freedom</p>	<p>"And war is a training in freedom. Or what is freedom? That one has the will to self-responsibility. That one preserves the distance which divides us. That one has become more indifferent to hardship, toil, privation, even to life. That one is ready to sacrifice men to one's cause, oneself not excepted. Freedom means that the manly instincts that delight in war and victory have gained mastery over the other instincts—for example, the instinct for 'happiness'. The man <i>who has become free</i>—and how much more the <i>mind</i> that has become free—spurns the contemptible sort of well-being dreamed of by shopkeepers, Christians, cows, women, Englishmen and other democrats. The free man is a <i>warrior</i>." (<i>TI</i> Skirmishes 38; connect to Hegel on the fraud of English freedom)</p>	<p>The social fundamental.</p>
<p>Power</p>	<p>"the most beautiful still appears only in the dark, and sinks, scarcely born, into eternal night—I mean the spectacle of that strength which employs genius <i>not for works</i> but for <i>itself as a work</i>; that is, for its own constraint, for the purification of its imagination, for the imposition of order and choice upon the influx of tasks and impressions. The great human being is still, in precisely the greatest thing that demands reverence, invisible like a too distant star: his <i>victory over strength</i> remains without eyes to see it and consequently without song and singer." (<i>D</i> 548)</p> <p>"He cannot control himself, and from that a poor woman infers that it will be easy to control him and casts her net for him. Soon she will be his slave." (<i>GS</i> 227)</p>	<p>Pluralistic</p>

Sex and marriage	State-run (<i>BGE</i> 251); see <i>D</i> 42	Romantic passion and individual choice
Cosmopolitanism and internationalism	Yes: "the strongest possible European mixed race." "One should not be afraid to proclaim oneself simply a good European and actively work for the amalgamation of nations." The means by which this is to be accomplished? "Trade and industry, the post and the book-trade, the possession in common of all higher culture, rapid changing of home and scene, the nomadic life now lived by all who do not own land" and their consequence, "a weakening and finally abolition of nations." (<i>Human</i> I: 475)	Cosmopolitanism yes. Functional nationalism as safety net.
Racism	No	No (<i>VOS</i>)
Women	"Women are considered profound. Why? Because one never fathoms their depths. Women aren't even shallow." (<i>TI</i> Maxims and Arrows 27)	Ethical and political equality. Equal existential and psychological competence. Some sexual-psychological differences between men and women.
Art and Sense of Life		
Exalted sense of human potential	Yes: "one emerges again and again into the light, one experiences again and again one's golden hour of victory—and then one stands forth as one was born, unbreakable, tensed, ready for new, even harder, remoter things, like a bow that distress serves to draw tauter." (<i>GM</i> 1:12)	Yes (<i>VOS</i> , 14, pb 22; "Introduction to <i>The Fountainhead</i> ," <i>TO</i> , March 1968, 4)
Engaged in a cosmic battle	Yes	Yes
Struggle as good	Yes (<i>BGE</i> 262)	Yes ("Art and Sense of Life," <i>RM</i> 48)
Suffering as essential to creativity and development	Yes. "The discipline of suffering, of great suffering—do you not know that only this discipline has created all enhancements of man so far? That tension of the soul in unhappiness which cultivates its strength, its shudders face to face with great ruin, its inventiveness and courage in enduring, persevering, interpreting, and exploiting suffering, and whatever has been granted to it of profundity, secret, mask, spirit, cunning, greatness—was it not granted to it through suffering, through the discipline of great suffering?" (<i>BGE</i> 225; also <i>BGE</i> 270) "Only great pain is the ultimate liberator of the spirit I doubt that such pain makes us 'better'; but I know that it makes us more profound" (<i>GS</i> Pref:3). To his kind of men: "I wish [them] suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities—I wish that they should not remain unfamiliar with profound self-contempt, the torture of self-mistrust, the wretchedness of the vanquished" (<i>WP</i> 910) Though out of this will/can come joy, gaiety, and being a free spirit.	Philosophically: No. Literarily: Yes.
Benevolent universe	No: Notebook of 1888: "For a philosopher to say, 'the good and the beautiful are one,' is infamy; if he goes on to add, 'also the true,' one ought to thrash him. Truth is ugly." "Conscious of the truth he has once seen, man now sees everywhere only the horror or	Yes

	absurdity of existence. He is nauseated." (BT7)	
Love your life no matter what	Yes: <i>Amor fati</i> . A <i>tragic</i> sense of life, not pessimistic. <i>GS</i> 48; <i>BGE</i> 56	Yes: create your fate
Art as metaphysical	Yes	Yes
Tragedy as highest	Yes: "For what purpose humanity is there should not even concern us: why you are there, that you should ask yourself: and if you have no ready answer, then set for yourself goals, high and noble goals, and perish in pursuit of them! I know of no better life purpose than to perish in attempting the great and the impossible..." (unpublished note from 1873)	No (<i>RM</i>)
Romanticism as highest	No: Contra Alexandrian man (<i>BT</i>)	Yes (<i>RM</i>). Contra Naturalism: ("What is Romanticism," <i>RM</i> , 81, pb 99; 83, pb 101; 102, pb 115; 104, pb 117; "The Esthetic Vacuum of our Age," <i>RM</i> , 114, pb 124; 116, pb 125; "The goal of my writing," <i>RM</i> , 163, pb 164; "The Basic Principles of Literature," <i>RM</i> , 60; pb 83; 61, pb 83)
Creating as egoistic/individualistic	No (<i>BT</i> 5);	Yes (<i>RM</i>)
Art and truth	"Art is <i>more valuable</i> than truth" (<i>WP</i> 853); "What one should learn from artists.—How can we make things beautiful, attractive, and desirable for us when they are not? And I rather think that in themselves they never are." (<i>GS</i> 299)	Art as concretization of abstractions.
Creativity	"We ... want to become those we are—human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves." (<i>GS</i> 335). "To become what one is, one must not have the faintest notion <i>what</i> one is." (<i>EH</i> "Why I am so Clever" 9; echoes of Kant on genius in <i>CJ</i> and Hegel on the Absolute's coming to self-awareness) "Every artist knows how far from any feeling of letting himself go his 'most natural state' is—the free ordering, placing, disposing, giving form in the moment of 'inspiration'—and how strictly and subtly he obeys thousandfold laws precisely then, laws that precisely on account of their hardness and determination defy all formulation through concepts." (<i>BGE</i> 188)	Learned. Integration of conscious and subconscious processes.
Art as palliative or inspirational fuel	Palliative: "As an aesthetic phenomenon existence is still bearable for us" (<i>GS</i> 107; Cf <i>BT</i> 5 and 24)	Inspirational fuel
Selectivity as a value-judgment	"An artist chooses his subjects; that is his way of praising." (<i>GS</i> 245)	Yes
Romanticism	"that barbaric though enchanting outpouring from an undisciplined and chaotic soul of hot and highly colored things, which is what we understood by art when we were young." (<i>HAH</i> 173; q in Hayman 209)	Yes
Suffering	"The discipline of suffering, of <i>great</i> suffering—do you not know that only <i>this</i> discipline has created all	As result of accidents of mistakes; not

	enhancements of man so far? That tension of the soul in unhappiness which cultivates its strength, its shudders face to face with great ruin, its inventiveness and courage in enduring, persevering, interpreting, and exploiting suffering, and whatever has been granted to it of profundity, secret, mask, spirit, cunning, greatness—was it not granted to it through suffering, through the discipline of great suffering?" (<i>BGE</i> 225)	fundamental
Beauty	"The noblest kind of beauty is not that which suddenly transports us, which makes a violent and intoxicating assault upon us (such beauty can easily excite disgust), but that which slowly infiltrates us, which we bear away with us almost without noticing and encounter again in dreams, but which finally, after having for long lain modestly in our heart, takes total possession of us, filling our eyes with tears and our heart with longing." (<i>HAAH</i> , 149)	
Cultural Analysis		
Cultural disaster looming	Yes: The West moves to "catastrophe, with a tortured tension that is growing from decade to decade." (<i>WP</i> , Preface; 2)	Yes: "we are a mixed economy, i.e., a mixture of capitalism and statism, of freedom and controls. A mixed economy is a country in the process of disintegration, a civil war of pressure groups looting and devouring each other." ("Check Your Premises" "The Obliteration of Capitalism," <i>TON</i> 4:10, October 1965, p. 47)
Sense of isolation from surrounding culture	Yes: "homeless in a distinctive and honorable sense" (<i>GS</i> 377)	Yes and no
The future as winnable	Yes, for some: "the first of a new nobility ... [and] a happiness ... humanity has not known so far." (<i>GS</i> 337)	Yes
On Others		
On Christianity	"A rebellion of everything that crawls on the ground against that which has height." (<i>A</i> 43) "The Christian idea of God": "is one of the most corrupt conceptions of God the world has ever seen God having degenerated into a <i>contradiction of life</i> instead of its transfiguration and eternal <i>yes!</i> God as declared aversion to life, to nature, to the will to life! God as every slander against the 'here and now'" (<i>A</i> 18).	Ditto ("Playboy's Interview with Ayn Rand," pamphlet, 10)
On Plato	"Plato is coward before reality." (<i>TI</i> What I Owe to the Ancients 2)	Ditto (<i>ITOE</i> , 2)
On Kant	"A catastrophic spider" (<i>A</i> 11); "that most deformed concept-cripple of all time" (<i>TI</i> , "What the Germans Lack" 7); Kant's "abhorrent scholasticism" (<i>TI</i> Skirmishes 49)	Kant's philosophy is a "monstrous spider hanging in midair" (<i>FNI</i> 34) "Causality Versus Duty," <i>PWNI</i> , 117, pb 97; "Brief Summary," <i>TO</i> , Sept., 1971, 4)
On the Jews	"a people firmly attached to life..." (<i>D</i> 72)	
Method and Style		

Rhetorical clarity	<p>Esotericism: "It is not by any means necessarily an objection to a book when anyone finds it impossible to understand: perhaps that was part of the author's intention—he did not want to be understood by just 'anybody.' All the nobler spirits and tastes select their audience when they wish to communicate; and choosing that, one at the same time erects barriers against 'the others.' All the more subtle laws of any style have their origin at this point: they at the same time keep away, create a distance, forbid 'entrance,' understanding, as said above — while they open the ears of those whose ears are related to ours." (<i>GS</i> 381)</p> <p>"<i>Being profound and seeming profound.</i>—Those who know that they are profound strive for clarity. Those who would like to seem profound to the crowd strive for obscurity. For the crowd believes that if it cannot see to the bottom of something it must be profound. It is so timid and dislikes going into the water" (<i>GS</i> 173)</p> <p>"Our highest insights must—and should—sound like follies and sometimes like crimes when they are heard without permission by those who are not predisposed and predestined for them" (<i>BGE</i> 30).</p>	Accessible and straightforward to all intelligent
Systematicity	<p>"Beware of systematizers!—There is a play-acting of systematizers: ... they will to impersonate complete and uniformly strong natures." (<i>D</i> 318)</p> <p>Contrast <i>GM</i> Preface:2</p>	Yes
Style	<p>"I fancy that with this Zarathustra I have brought the German language to its full realization. After <i>Luther</i> and Goethe a third step had to be taken—tell me, my old friend, whether there has ever been such a combination of strength, resilience and euphony. Read Goethe after a page of my book ... my line is tougher, more virile, without ever lapsing into coarseness, like Luther's. My style is <i>dance</i>, playing with symmetries of every kind, jumping over them and mocking them. This enters the very vowels." (Feb 22, 1884 letter to Rohde; q Hayman 272)</p>	Romantic, cinematic
Philosophy and Fiction	Zarathustra	Atlas
Absorbing and transcending literary traditions	Biblical language	"Odysseus, Jesus, and Dagny" themes
Miscellany		
Symbolisms	Apollo and Dionysus	End of <i>AS</i> : Galt's tracing the dollar sign and Wyatt's Torch in the distance
	" <i>Sum, ergo cogito: cogito, ergo sum.</i> " (<i>GS</i> 276)	"reversing a costly historical error": "I am, therefore I'll think." (<i>AS</i>)
Architecture	<i>GS</i> 291 on Genoa's architecture	Opening paragraphs of <i>F</i> .
Reception by contemporary philosophers	"For a time, Nietzsche, then professor of classical philology at the University of Basle, had no students in his field. His lectures were sabotaged by German philosophy professors who advised their students not to show up for Nietzsche's courses." (M. Cowen 1962, "Introduction" to Nietzsche's <i>Philosophy in the Tragic</i>	

	<i>Age of the Greeks, 4)</i>	
Early and late periods	<p>Schopenhauer and Kant. Early more idealist metaphysical; later more positivist.</p> <p>"Thinking out the principle problems ... always brings me back ... to the same conclusions :they are already there, as veiled and obscure as possible in my <i>Geburt der Tragödie</i>, and everything I have since learned has become and ingrown part of them." (Letter to Franz Overbeck, 2 July 1885; q Hayman 286)</p>	Aristotle, Nietzsche, and the Romantics
Titles of works	<p>N's subtitles in <i>EH</i>: Some have suggested megalomania or madness. Ironic honesty. Countering Socrates's modesty about not being wise. Countering Jesus's admonition to humility. Countering false modesty of most autobiographies: most such pretend not be telling us how wise and clever they are. Plus good marketing: arresting. Plus truth: N was clever and dynamite.</p>	<i>Selfishness</i> . Heinz Pagels remark: "No great science was done in the spirit of humility."
Issue	Nietzsche's position	Rand's position